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DON’T TREAD ON ME…ONLINE:  
THE FEC SHOULD STAY OUT OF FREE 
INTERNET-BASED POLITICAL SPEECH 
Timothy J. D’Elia* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Written letters, public postings, and print media provided a vehicle for polit-
ical speech in America for nearly three centuries.1 One of the first American 
newspapers, the New England Courant, published a letter in 1722, in which the 
author commented: “whoever would overthrow the Liberty of a Nation, must 
begin by subduing the Freeness of Speech.”2  The tone and medium of political 
speech have changed, but free speech remains one of America’s most cher-
ished fundamental rights.3 The advent of the Internet created a new populist 
forum for political speech, replacing historical speech vehicles like Franklin’s 
                                                 
* J.D. Candidate, May 2016, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; 
B.S., 2004, Indiana University. The author would like to thank Professor Mark Rienzi for 
his guidance throughout the writing process as well as his colleagues at the Catholic Univer-
sity of America, Journal of Law and Technology for their editing assistance. The author 
would also like to thank Commissioner Lee E. Goodman and his staff for their candor and 
responsiveness to an unknown law student’s questions. 
 1 Randolph E. Schmid, U.S. Postal Service Survey Reveals Personal Letters at Record 
Low, HUFF. POST (Oct. 3, 2011, 12:46 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/03/postal-service-annual-survey-personal-
letters_n_992432 (statement of Prof. Webster Newbold) (“Letters were the prime medium 
of communication among individuals and even important in communities as letters were 
shared, read aloud and published.”). 
 2 Letter no. 8 from Silence Dogood to the Author of the New-England Courant (July 9, 
1722), in 49 THE NEW-ENGLAND COURANT, 
http://www.masshist.org/online/silence_dogood/img-
viewer.php?item_id=645&img_step=1&tpc=&pid=&mode=small&tpc=&pid=#page1. 
 3 Elec. Frontier Found. & Ctr. for Dem. & Tech., Comment Letter on Advanced Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking on Aggregate Biennial Contribution Limits at 2 (Jan. 15, 2015), 
[hereinafter EFF & CDT Comments], 
https://www.eff.org/files/2015/01/15/eff_and_cdt_comments_re_internet_regulations_jan._
15_2015.pdf (“Furthermore, the United States has a long tradition of anonymous political 
speech, dating back as far as Thomas Paine’s “Common Sense” and many of the Federalist 
Papers.”). 
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letter or Thomas Paine’s “Common Sense” pamphlet.4 
The Internet has created an unparalleled forum for First Amendment expres-
sion, where any and all speakers can drive the marketplace of social ideas, 
opinions, and conscience.5 The technology of the Internet is unique among 
forums for disseminating political speech content because one Internet user 
may instantaneously share political speech with a massive audience.6 Any citi-
zen has the potential to influence a large audience with political speech content 
using only an Internet connection and a desire to participate in the debate.7 
Now in 140 characters or less, Twitter users offer political opinions, “retweet” 
the comments of others, get real-time news updates, and use “hashtags” to 
identify the discussion of common topics and interests.8  On Facebook, mem-
bers “follow” the conversations and whereabouts of people who interest them, 
give “likes” to those they agree with, and occasionally study opposing view-
points.9 
                                                 
 4 See generally The Rise of the Internet, IBM 100, http://www-
03.ibm.com/ibm/history/ibm100/us/en/icons/internetrise/impacts (last visited Oct. 30, 2015) 
(“The Internet has transformed how people live, work, shop and communicate. Its impact on 
business, research, global politics and communication cannot be overestimated.”). 
 5 See THE FRONTIER LAB, WATCHING YOU: PRIVATE GIVING AND THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT 4 (2015), http://thefrontierlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/TFL_Watching-
You_020615_Final_72.pdf (“Respondents consistently remarked that they felt Free Speech, 
as a whole is not threatened and in fact is thriving. As evidence they cited the Internet and 
its creation of a more robust channel for information exchange, including a way to voice 
dissent.”); see also Lee E. Goodman, Online Political Opinions Don’t Need Regulating, 
WALL ST. J.,  Jan. 2, 2015, at A15 [hereinafter Goodman, Online Political Opinions] (“Mil-
lions of citizens are now empowered to speak widely as commenters, bloggers, podcasters, 
YouTube posters and Facebook supporters, while new technologies have facilitated a record 
number of new political communities at a fraction of historical costs.”). 
 6 See Viral Video, TECHOPEDIA, http://www.techopedia.com/definition/26863/viral-
video (last visited Mar. 1, 2015) (defining viral videos as a video clip that is rapidly spread 
online). 
 7 Derek Willis, Coming to Your Facebook Feed: More Political Videos, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/05/upshot/coming-to-your-facebook-feed-
more-political-videos.html?_r=0&abt=0002&abg=0 (“Although “red-meat” ads might gen-
erate likes or shares among a candidate or party’s base — a valuable outcome — it can be 
hard for them to gain wider traction online and take advantage of a social network, where 
ideas and images move from user to user.”). 
 8 See FAQs about Retweets (RT), TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/77606-
faqs-about-retweets-rt (last visited Mar. 1, 2015) (stating that a Retweet is a “re-posting of 
someone else’s Tweet,” done to immediately share with all of your followers, and that a 
Tweet that begins with “RT” indicates that it is re-posting someone else’s content); see also 
Elizabeth Kricfalusi, The Twitter Hashtag: What Is It and How Do You Use It?, TECH FOR 
LUDDITES (Aug. 2, 2015), http://techforluddites.com/the-twitter-hashtag-what-is-it-and-how-
do-you-use-it/ (noting that a hashtag is signified by the “#” symbol preceding a word or 
phrase and is used as a method “for people to search for tweets that have a common topic”). 
 9 What does it mean to follow someone? FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/279614732052951 (last visited Aug. 26, 2015). 
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The Internet is also increasingly competing with fee-based television, radio, 
and print mass media to become the dominant venue for political communica-
tion in America.10  Countless blogs contribute to the discussion of news stories 
with a never-ending stream of opinion pieces, reporting, and analysis.11 Anoth-
er genre of websites, commonly called “news aggregators,”12 post a selection 
of current news stories and opinion pieces from sources collected across the 
Internet and from around the world.13 YouTube has become especially promi-
nent in the world of politics.14 Streaming video clips of interviews, video-
blogs, educational segments, and documentaries are posted and subject to their 
own viewer commentary on YouTube.15 
For example, free videos posted on YouTube by Barrack Obama’s 2008 
presidential campaign were watched for a total of 14.5 million hours.16 Accord-
ing to statistics from Blue State Digital, the Obama campaign’s online efforts 
included the creation of more than 400,000 blog entries, organizing 45,000 
volunteer groups online, and posting over 1,000 YouTube videos supporting 
the candidate.17 Despite being a dynamic and egalitarian venue for pure First 
Amendment political speech, proponents of expanding campaign finance laws 
want to limit the content and quantity of speech on the Internet.18 
                                                 
 10 LEE E. GOODMAN, LAW AND ELECTION POLITICS: THE RULES OF THE GAME 50-51 
(Matthew J. Streb ed., 2d ed. 2013) [hereinafter GOODMAN, LAW & ELECTION POLITICS]. 
 11 See, e.g., Frank Vyan Walton, Some [More] Policy Suggestions for #BlackLivesMat-
ter, DAILY KOS (Aug. 23, 2015, 7:47 AM), 
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2015/08/23/1413975/-Some-More-Policy-Suggestions-for-
BlackLivesMatter; Andrew Stuttaford, The War on Drugs Backfires Again, RICOCHET (Aug. 
23, 2015), https://ricochet.com/war-drugs-backfires/; ACE OF SPADES HQ, http://ace.mu.nu 
(last visited Aug. 23, 2015); HUFFPOST POLITICS: THE BLOGS, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/politics/the-blog (last visited Aug. 23, 2015). See also Chris 
Cillizza, The Fix’s best state based political blogs – extended edition!, WASH. POST (Mar. 
12, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/03/12/the-fixs-best-state-
based-political-blogs-extended-edition (providing an extensive list of reader nominated 
political blogs in all 50 states, although West Virginia submitted no entry). 
 12 See Kimberly Isbell, The Rise of the News Aggregator: Legal Implications and Best 
Practices 2 (Berkman Ctr. for Internet & Soc., Res. Pub. No. 2010-10, 2010), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1670339. 
 13 See, e.g., DRUDGE REPORT, www.drudgereport.com (last visited Aug. 24, 2015); 
HUFF. POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com (last visited Aug. 24, 2015); SAYFIE REVIEW, 
http://www.sayfiereview.com (last visited Aug. 24, 2015); REAL CLEAR POLITICS, 
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/?state=nwa (last visited Aug. 24, 2015). 
 14 The Youtube-ification of Politics: Candidates losing control, CNN.COM (Jul. 18, 
2007, 7:42 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/07/18/youtube.effect/index.html?eref=rss_tech. 
 15 About YouTube, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/yt/about/ (last visited Aug. 23, 
2015). 
 16 GOODMAN, LAW AND ELECTION POLITICS, supra note 10, at 49-50. 
 17 Id. at 50. 
 18 Statement of Reasons, Vice Chair Ravel at 1-2, MUR 6729 (Checks and Balances) 
[hereinafter SOR, Vice Chair Ravel, MUR 6729]. 
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In response to these advances in technology and the recent holdings of the 
Supreme Court, the Federal Election Commission (“FEC” or the “Commis-
sion”) issued an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“ANPRM”) on 
October 17, 2014.19 Based on subsequent Commission activity, three Commis-
sioners issued a statement on October 29, 2014, seeking to clarify the scope of 
the ANPRM’s inquiry by encouraging the public to comment on the FEC’s 
treatment of online activity.20 The public responded with roughly 5,000 com-
ments weighing in on the merits of regulating Internet-based political speech.21 
The Commission’s inquiry into regulating free Internet-based political 
speech should resolve that such proposals misunderstand current laws and fun-
damentally undervalue the importance of unfettered political speech. Speech 
cannot be regulated merely because advancements in communications technol-
ogy might increase the reach and influence of political commentary on the In-
ternet. Utilizing the tools of the Internet to voice political speech does not cre-
ate the appearance or the actuality of corruption.  In the absence of quid pro 
quo corruption, the FEC does not have statutory authority, nor is there a consti-
tutional basis, to regulate free speech. Imposing restrictions on cost-free Inter-
net content would create a chilling effect on an incredible forum for dissemi-
nating political ideas and opinions.  Ultimately, the policy of regulating free 
political Internet content uses conjectures of corruption to justify a regulatory 
remedy that is not needed. 
Part I of this Note provides a brief overview of free speech doctrine as it has 
been developed in response to various government efforts to restrict political 
speech. Part II examines the FEC’s 2006 Internet rules and responds to recent 
calls to reevaluate them. Part III argues that the FEC lacks the statutory author-
ity to effectuate further restrictions on free political Internet content. Part IV 
argues that restricting political speech on the Internet through disclosure and 
disclaimer requirements is facially unconstitutional and would chill political 
speech. Finally, Part V asserts that even if the FEC maintains statutory and 
constitutional authority to regulate free political speech on the Internet, doing 
so would be a misguided hindrance to democracy. 
                                                 
 19 Aggregate Biennial Contribution Limits, 79 Fed. Reg. 62,361, 62,361 (Oct. 17, 
2014). 
 20 Id. 
 21 See Colby Itkowitz, FEC deluge: Thousands Comment On the Issue of Money In 
Politics, WASH. POST. (Jan. 27, 2015) (stating that approximately 75 percent of the people 
who weighed in were in favor of greater regulation from the FEC); see also Press Release, 
Fed. Election Comm’n., FEC Hears Wide Public Comment on the McCutcheon v. FEC 
(Feb. 11, 2015) (on file with author) (noting that specifically over 32,000 people from 
across the country participated in the public commenting process). 
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II. THE ABC’S OF REGULATING POLITICAL SPEECH: FROM ALIEN 
ACTS TO BUCKLEY AND CITIZEN’S UNITED 
The right to free political speech is foundational to the concepts of liberty 
and democracy in America.22 American citizens have exercised this right since 
the Founders announced, “a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires 
that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.”23 
Since our Declaration of Independence, there has been a tug-of-war between 
assertions of governmental authority to limit the influence of speech,24 and 
speakers who challenge the government’s power to moderate political speech.25 
A. Free Speech for All...As Long as the Government Approves 
Twenty years after the United States was formed in rejection of the unques-
tionable authority of the British Monarchy, the Alien and Sedition Acts out-
lawed even the intent to oppose any measure of the government.26  Other less 
egregious attempts to control speech content include indirectly limiting politi-
                                                 
 22 Floyd Abrams & Burt Neuborne, Debating ‘Citizens United’, THENATION.COM, (Jan. 
13, 2011), http://www.thenation.com/article/157720/debating-citizens-united (describing the 
decision of Citizens United as rooted in the well-established legal proposition that “political 
speech, especially political speech about whom to vote for or against, is at the core of the 
First Amendment”). 
 23 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). 
 24 See e.g., Tillman Act of 1907, 34 Stat. 864 (1907) (prohibiting corporations from 
making money contributions in connection with political elections); see also Labor Man-
agement Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947 § 304, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136, 159-
60 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. 186(c)(5)) (prohibiting labor unions from making monetary 
contributions in connection with political elections); see also Lee E. Goodman, The Feds 
Flirt With Reining in TV Talk, WALL ST. J ., Feb. 4, 2014, at A17 [hereinafter Goodman, 
Feds Flirt With TV]. 
History is rife with government efforts to disrupt, investigate and even silence dis-
senting published opinion. From early colonial times when royal governments pun-
ished and shuttered printers critical of royal governors, to film-review-board censor-
ship, attempts to enjoin the printing of the Pentagon Papers and, more recently, gov-
ernment preying into journalists’ telephone records, government power has proved 
to be a dangerous threat to freedom of the press. 
Id. 
 25 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (“Premised 
on mistrust of governmental power, the First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor 
certain subjects or viewpoints.”)  (citing United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, 
Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)); see also George Will, Policing Political Speech, NAT’L 
REVIEW (Apr. 19, 2014, 8:00 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/376018/policing-
political-speech-george-will (commenting on Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus which 
addressed an Ohio election law regulating the “false statements” made in political cam-
paigns, “[t]hese developments are not coincidental. Government’s increasing reach and 
pretensions necessarily become increasingly indiscriminate.”). 
 26 See Sedition Act of 1798, 1 Stat. 596 (Jul. 14, 1798) (this law was one of four laws 
known collectively as the Alien and Sedition Acts). 
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cal speech by moderating “fairness” in public debate,27 and governmental de-
terminations of which content is “critical” to the free exchange of ideas.28 Con-
gress recently asserted a view on the permissible influence of political speech, 
when 48 Senators voted to rewrite the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitu-
tion.29 Likewise, retired Justice John Paul Stevens suggested that the First 
Amendment should be modified to reflect his beliefs on the proper allocations 
of influence for political speech.30 
B. The FEC’s Constitutional Authority is Discovered Two Hundred Years 
After the First Amendment is Authored 
The Supreme Court is frequently called upon to resolve differing interpreta-
                                                 
 27 See KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40009, FAIRNESS DOCTRINE: 
HISTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 1-3 (2011), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40009.pdf 
(providing the Federal Communication Commission’s (“FCC”) policy between 1949 and 
1987 known as the “Fairness Doctrine,” as the requirement that broadcasters identify issues 
of public importance, cover those issues, and afford representatives of opposing viewpoints 
the opportunity to present their case to the community; and, the FCC’s conclusion that the 
policy likely violated the First Amendment); see also General Fairness Doctrine Obligations 
of Broadcast Licensees, 50 Fed. Reg. 35,418 (Aug. 8, 1985) (discussing the FCC’s analysis 
of the unconstitutional chilling effect of the Fairness Doctrine). 
 28 See SOC. SOLUTIONS INT’L INC., RESEARCH DESIGN FOR THE MULTI-MARKET STUDY 
OF CRITICAL INFORMATION NEEDS 2 (2013), https://transition.fcc.gov/ bu-
reaus/ocbo/FCC_Final_Research_Design_6_markets.pdf (defining goals and a research 
design plan for identifying and understanding the “Critical Information Needs” (“CIN”) of 
the American public); but cf. Ajit Pai, The FCC Wades Into the Newsroom, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 10, 2014, at A14 (stating the opinion of FCC Commissioner Ajit Pai that the CIN study 
improperly pressures media organizations to cover categories of news that the FCC has 
selected); see also Truthy: Information diffusion research at Indiana University, INDI-
ANA.EDU, http://truthy.indiana.edu (last visited Feb. 17, 2015) (featuring a highly controver-
sial study federally funded by the National Science Foundation (“NSF”) on how infor-
mation, known as “memes,” spread on social media); see also MIKE GONZALEZ, THE HERIT-
AGE FOUND., ISSUE BRIEF NO. 4287, CONGRESS MUST STOP YET ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO MUF-
FLE FREE SPEECH 1-2 (2014), http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2014/pdf/IB4287.pdf 
(arguing that the NSF seeks to constrain free speech to detect political smears, astroturfing, 
misinformation, and other social pollution on social media and “mitigate the diffusion of 
false and misleading ideas, detect hate speech and subversive propaganda, and assist in the 
preservation of open debate”) (internal quotations and footnotes omitted). 
 29 See S. J. Res. 19, 113th Cong. § 1 (2014) (proposing an amendment to the Constitu-
tion that allows Congress and the States to “regulate and set reasonable limits on the raising 
and spending of money by candidates and others to influence elections.”). 
 30 See JOHN PAUL STEVENS, SIX AMENDMENTS: HOW AND WHY WE SHOULD CHANGE 
THE CONSTITUTION 79 (2014) 
I therefore propose this amendment to the Constitution: Neither the First Amend-
ment nor any other provisions of this Constitution shall be construed to prohibit the 
Congress or any state from imposing reasonable limits on the amount of money that 
candidates for public office, or their supporters, may spend in election campaigns. 
Id. 
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tions of the government’s ability to limit speech.31 The Court has consistently 
affirmed the people’s right to an “unfettered” exchange of ideas for bringing 
about political and social change.32 Included in the Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence is the inherent right to make political contributions and expendi-
tures to support an idea, a candidate, or target a particular audience.33 However, 
the Court’s interpretations of applying these axioms continue to evolve.34 
The FEC was created by an act of Congress in 197435 to be a watchdog for 
                                                 
 31 See, e.g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2338 (2014) (challeng-
ing an Ohio statute that prohibits certain “false statements” during the course of a political 
campaign on the grounds that the petitioner sufficiently established standing to make a pre-
enforcement challenge justiciable); see also, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of 
State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 609-10 (1967) (striking down as unconstitutional, a New York 
law that required state university employees to certify that they were not members of the 
Communist party, or if they had ever been, requiring the employees to notify the universi-
ty’s president); see also, e.g., United States v. Cong. of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. 106, 121-23 
(1948) (holding that the prohibition of any “expenditure in connection with any election” as 
applicable to the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, could not be interpreted to pro-
hibit organizations from publishing periodicals advising their members, stockholders or 
customers, about the danger or advantage of particular measures, or electing candidates who 
support those measures); see also, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47,  52-53 (1919) 
(finding that the distribution of leaflets using language in opposition of the draft was not 
protected by the First Amendment right to free speech). 
 32 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964). 
The general proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is secured 
by the First Amendment has long been settled by our decisions. The constitutional 
safeguard, we have said, was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for 
the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people. (internal 
quotation omitted). 
Id. 
 33 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 314 (“All speakers, including individuals and the 
media, use money amassed from the economic marketplace to fund their speech. The First 
Amendment protects the resulting speech.”); see also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 
514 U.S. 334, 355 (1995) (“Nonetheless, even though money may “talk,” its speech is less 
specific, less personal, and less provocative than a handbill—and as a result, when money 
supports an unpopular viewpoint it is less likely to precipitate retaliation.”); see also Buck-
ley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) 
[V]irtually every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the 
expenditure of money. The distribution of the humblest handbill or leaflet entails 
printing, paper, and circulation costs. Speeches and rallies generally necessitate hir-
ing a hall and publicizing the event. The electorate’s increasing dependence on tele-
vision, radio, and other mass media for news and information has made these expen-
sive modes of communication indispensable instruments of effective political 
speech. 
Id. 
 34 See McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1436 (2014) (“The right 
to participate in democracy through political contributions is protected by the First Amend-
ment, but that right is not absolute. Congress may regulate…”); see also Citizens United, 
558 U.S. at 310. 
 35 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 § 310(a)(1), Pub. L. No. 93-
443, 88 Stat. 1263, 1280-81 (1974). 
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the actuality and appearance of corruption in federal elections. In 1976, Buck-
ley v. Valeo held that the FEC’s power to prevent corruption extended to limit 
speech by a dollar amount.36 The Court divined that when an individual or 
group contributed in excess of $1,000 to a political candidate, the contribution 
amounted to the actuality and appearance of corruption.37 Various state and 
federal laws enacted since Buckley have attempted to codify the view that 
spending money to have a political voice be heard must be constrained by 
amount, 38 restricted by the classification of speakers,39 subject to broad disclo-
sure requirements,40 or counteracted by public funding,41 to prevent real or per-
ceived corruption in the exchange of ideas. 
C. All Citizens Enjoy the Right to Political Speech  
More recently, in Citizen’s United, the Court clarified the distinction be-
tween corruption and influence by restating the essential premise of the First 
Amendment: political speech is a venerated right for which few government 
interests suffice to justify speech limitations on any class of speaker.42 Four 
years later, McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n declared individual aggre-
                                                 
 36 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26 (“It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act’s primary pur-
pose—to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual 
financial contributions—in order to find a constitutionally sufficient justification for the 
$1,000 contribution limitation.”). 
 37 Id. 
 38 See e.g., McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1434 (addressing the Federal Elections Campaign 
Act’s (FECA) aggregate limit on candidate contributions and other contributions to party 
committees). 
 39 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 310 (challenging regulatory limits on campaign 
spending by organizations); see also Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right To Life, 
Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 449 (2007) (challenging the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s 
(“BCRA”) prohibition on the use of corporate funds to finance “electioneering communica-
tions” during pre-federal-election periods). 
 40 See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 93 (2003) (challenging sever-
al provisions of the BCRA regarding “soft money,” donations to tax-exempt organizations, 
and the constitutional validity of several definitions within the Act) overruled by Citizens 
United, 558 U.S. at 310. 
 41 See Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2806 
(2011) (challenging the constitutionality of an Arizona law that matched every dollar spent 
by a privately-funded candidate with public funds for their publicly-funded opponents); see 
also Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 724 (2008) (challenging provisions of 
the BCRA that involved coordinated campaign spending from party committees for oppo-
nents of self-financed candidates). 
 42 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365 (“We return to the principle established in Buck-
ley and Bellotti that the Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the 
speaker’s corporate identity. No sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the polit-
ical speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.”). 
2015] Don't Tread On Me...Online 185 
gate contribution limits as unconstitutional because the speech of individuals 
may not be limited “simply to reduce the amount of money in politics, or to 
restrict the political participation of some in order to enhance the relative influ-
ence of others.”43 The constitutional right to free political speech can be traced 
from the nation’s founding to the present day, but new methods of exercising 
free speech bring new interpretations of the First Amendment.44 
III. INTERNET SPEECH REGULATIONS? YEAH, WE’VE GOT THAT: 
FEC CHAIR PROPOSES REEVALUATING COST-FREE POLITICAL 
SPEECH ON THE INTERNET 
During the 2012 election cycle, a nonprofit group called Checks and Bal-
ances for Economic Growth (“Checks and Balances”), posted two YouTube 
videos that challenged comments made by President Obama and Senator Sher-
rod Brown about the coal industry.45  The videos became controversial when a 
nonprofit legal activist organization, called Citizens for Responsibility and 
Ethics in Washington (“CREW”),46 filed a complaint with the FEC, alleging 
that the Checks and Balances’ YouTube videos violated the Federal Election 
Campaign Act (“FECA” or “Act”).47 The FEC reviewed the complaint and 
failed to reach a majority vote necessary to enforce a violation against Checks 
and Balances.48 In response to the 3-to-3 deadlocked vote on these YouTube 
videos,49 FEC Chairwoman Ann M. Ravel50 issued a statement calling for an 
                                                 
 43 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441. 
 44 See, e.g., id. at 1438 (“The Government may no more restrict how many candidates or 
causes a donor may support than it may tell a newspaper how many candidates it may en-
dorse.”) 
 45 checks Balances, TV Ad: Why Would You Lie, YOUTUBE (Oct. 14, 2012), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9oE1O38-IIE; checks Balances, TV AD—The War on 
Coal: Sherrod Brown vs. Ohio Coal Miners, YOUTUBE (Oct. 19, 2012), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgPkQYc0O5k. 
 46 About Us, CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBILITY AND ETHICS IN WASHINGTON, 
http://www.citizensforethics.org/pages/about (last visited Aug. 27, 2015) (“CREW uses 
high-impact legal actions to target government officials who sacrifice the common good to 
special interests.”). 
 47 MUR 6729 (Checks and Balances), Compl. at 1 (Apr. 4, 2013), 
http://eqs.fec.gov/eqsdocsMUR/14044363701.pdf; see also Carl Franzen, Online Political 
Ads Are More Secretive Than TV Ads, THE VERGE (Oct. 27, 2014, 4:45 PM), 
http://www.theverge.com/2014/10/27/7079329/fec-democrats-want-to-investigate-online-
political-ads. 
 48 See First Gen. Counsel’s Rpt. at 1, MUR 6729 (Checks and Balances) (“First GCR”) 
http://eqs.fec.gov/eqsdocsMUR/14044363793.pdf (noting that the Deputy Secretary’s re-
ported on the deadlocked 3-3 vote reflecting that the Commission failed to find reason to 
believe Checks and Balances violated the provisions of the FECA as alleged). 
 49 See id. 
 50 About the FEC, FED. ELECTION COMM’N (Aug. 27, 2015), 
http://www.fec.gov/members/ravel/ravel_bio.shtml. Ravel was elected to the Commission in 
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update to the Commission’s regulation of political content on the Internet.51 
A. The Genesis of the 2006 Internet Freedom Rules 
Chairwoman Ravel’s analysis of the Checks and Balances vote, was that the 
regulations issued to address Internet communications in 2006 were deficient 
for the FEC’s purpose.52 However, the regulations that created an exemption 
for cost-free Internet speech were the product of a decade of lessons learned—
going back to the 1990’s—from the Commission’s attempts to regulate politi-
cal content on the Internet.  In 1995, the FEC tried to regulate websites as 
“public communications” like radio or television advertisements.53 In practice, 
this method of broadly imposing traditional regulations on Internet communi-
cations included substantial challenges, such as, assigning a monetary value to 
emails and websites.54 As a result, the FEC altered its approach by attempting 
to regulate Internet communications on a case-by-case basis, resulting in ill-
fitting solutions and regulatory schizophrenia.55 
What the Commission ultimately designed in 2006 represents a thoughtful 
balance of the anti-corruption values of traditional campaign finance regula-
tions and protection of the low-cost populist participation in democracy facili-
tated by the Internet.56 The Commission defined “Internet activities” as includ-
ing, but not limited to, “[s]ending or forwarding electronic messages; provid-
ing a hyperlink or other direct access to another person’s website; blogging; 
creating maintaining or hosting a website; paying a nominal fee for the use of 
another person’s website; and any other form of communication distributed 
over the Internet.”57 Consistent with campaign finance restrictions on other 
forms of communication, these regulations require that compensated Internet 
communications must be disclosed by the political committee or campaign 
                                                                                                                 
2013, served as Vice Chairwoman in 2014 and serves as the Chairwoman in 2015. Id. 
 51 See SOR, Vice Chair Ravel at 1, MUR 6729. 
 52 See id. at 1-2; see also Internet Communications, 71 Fed. Reg. 18,589. 
 53 GOODMAN, LAW & ELECTION POLITICS, supra note 10, at 51 (citing FEC Advisory Op. 
1995-1999). 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 51-52. 
 56 Id. at 52. 
The question the FEC continued to face was whether the Internet and its low-cost 
technologies had eclipsed a complex cobweb of laws and regulations conceived for 
the high-cost media-centered politics of the late twentieth century. An informed an-
swer to that question required a thorough consideration of competing democratic 
values – the anti-corruption values justifying the old restrictions versus the populist 
democratic participation facilitated by the new technologies. 
Id. 
 57 11 C.F.R. § 100.155(b) (2014). 
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paying for the communication.58 Uncompensated Internet communications do 
not require reporting or disclaimer where the content is distributed for free and 
only on the Internet.59 
Traditional campaign finance regulations require disclosure reports, in part, 
based on expenditures for production and dissemination costs.60 The FEC ex-
amined the role of expenditures and contributions for bloggers when promul-
gating the 2006 rules, and determined that individuals and groups of individu-
als should be free to engage political speech on the Internet without counting 
each political communication as a contribution.61  Therefore, cost-free Internet 
communications do not require reporting because they are subject to a broad 
“Internet exemption,” which the Commission intended to “make clear, appro-
priately so, that individuals and groups engaging in unfettered political dis-
course over the Internet using their own computer facilities or those publicly 
available are not subject to regulation under the campaign finance laws.”62 The 
Internet freedom rules recognize that the Internet creates an open and level 
playing field for all speakers because there are no dissemination costs for polit-
ical commentary posted on Twitter, blogs, or YouTube.63 
                                                 
 58 See Internet Communications, 71 Fed. Reg. at 18,602; see also 52 U.S.C. § 
30104(f)(3)(A)(i); see also 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(a) (defining “electioneering communica-
tions” to include broadcast, cable, or satellite communications as subject to reporting or 
disclaimer requirements); see also Statement of Reasons, Chairman Goodman & Comm’rs 
Hunter & Petersen at 1, MUR 6729 (Checks and Balances) [hereinafter SOR, Chairman 
Goodman & Comm’rs Hunter & Petersen, MUR 6729]. 
 59 See 11 CFR §§ 100.94, 100.155 (establishing uncompensated Internet activity that is 
not considered a contribution or expenditure, respectively). 
 60 See 52 U.S.C. § 30104. 
 61 See Internet Communications, 71 Fed. Reg. at 18,602 (“The Commission agrees that 
the Act does not require a disclaimer when a blogger or other person accepts payment from 
a Federal candidate.”); see also GOODMAN, LAW AND ELECTION POLITICS, Supra note 10, at 
58 (“The FEC concluded that individuals and groups of individuals should be free to engage 
in voluntary and independent Internet speech and should be free to post electoral messages 
on the Internet without counting such communications as quantifiable “contributions” or 
“expenditures” subject to regulation”). 
 62 SOR, Chairman Goodman & Comm’rs Hunter & Petersen at 3, MUR 6729. 
 63 GOODMAN, LAW AND ELECTION POLITICS, Supra note 10, at 57 (“This deregulation 
applies even to online postings that cost significant sums of money to produce. The produc-
tion costs simply do not count as a regulated expenditure because the cost of public dissem-
ination is free.”); see also Melissa Quinn, The Threat to Political Speech Online: Q&A With 
Former Elections Chief Lee Goodman, THE DAILY SIGNAL (Jan. 3, 2015), 
http://dailysignal.com/2015/01/03/future-political-speech-online-qa-fec-chairman-lee-
goodman/ (statement of  Former FEC Chairman Goodman). 
[E]ach video would have to carry a disclaimer at the bottom indicating who paid for 
it and whether it was authorized by a political candidate. Second, BarelyPoliti-
cal.com would have to file expenditure reports with the Federal Election Commis-
sion disclosing the first date on which they post each YouTube video and how much 
they spent on the production. 
Id. 
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Additionally, the 2006 regulations recognize the ubiquitous nature of cost-
free Internet speech content makes it almost impossible to regulate.64 To en-
force disclosure of every political comment posted online would require the 
FEC to constantly troll Internet content to verify registrations or subpoena ex-
penditure information from individual content generators.65 Any failure of 
comprehensive enforcement could support concerns of selective, politically 
motivated enforcement.66  Such a granular review of every Internet speaker 
voicing his or her political comments would not be an efficient use of Com-
mission resources.67 
Even if the FEC could design a workable review process for determining 
how to identify violations, the same issues in calculating expenditures that ex-
isted prior to the 2006 rules would plague that process today.68 Without the 
Internet exemption, the FEC would have to evaluate each commenter’s ex-
                                                 
 64 Id. (statement of Former FEC Chairman Goodman) (“I cannot imagine how the Fed-
eral Election Commission will begin to regulate hundreds of thousands of blogs, YouTube 
videos, chat rooms, emails and links, and all sorts of Internet-based political discussion be-
cause of how vast political discussion on the Internet currently is.”); Jamie Williams, Tell 
the FEC Not to Amp Up Internet Regulations, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 12, 2015), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/01/tell-fec-not-amp-internet-regulations (“[W]e do not 
have confidence that a politically appointed government board will be able to draw a line 
that separates the individual blogger or YouTuber from deep-pocketed special interest 
groups without damaging free speech.”). 
 65 Quinn, supra note 63 (statement of Former FEC Chairman Goodman). 
[T]o establish an Internet review board where a room full of government bureaucrats 
sit on a daily basis and troll the Internet for political commentary — to identify 
online commentators who did not register or report their expenses in connection with 
their website, and to issue subpoenas seeking information about their expenditures. I 
know of no other way that the FEC could regulate the hundreds of thousands of 
posts on the Internet, absent such a review process. 
Id. 
 66 Hans A. von Spakovsky, The Heritage Found., Testimony before the Fed. Election 
Comm’n (Feb. 11, 2015) (transcript available at 
http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/2015/advance-notice-of-proposed-rulemaking-
on-aggregate-biennial-contribution-limits) (“[R]equiring…thousands of online bloggers, 
websites, commenters, podcasters, and kitchen table journalists and reports 
would…invariably lead to the charge of selective, politically motivated enforcement.”). 
 67 See Factual & Legal Analysis at 4, MUR 6795 (CREW) (“F&LA”). 
 68 Ronald D. Rotunda, Targeting Political Speech for the Next Election, WALL ST. J., 
Nov. 4, 2014, at A19 (noting the former CFPPC Commissioner’s practical concerns for 
calculating expenditures). 
If someone’s tweet includes a hyperlink to a political website, what is the value that 
this person must report? How does one deal with negative tweets—for example, 
“you can’t believe what Joe’s website is advocating today”? Would there be disclo-
sures if a candidate—or someone who engages in independent expenditures for or 
against a candidate—later buys an advertisement on a blog, or increases blog traffic 
by commenting on the blog? 
Id.; see also EFF & CDT Comments at 2. 
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penditures to include costs like software used to generate content, an Internet 
connection, domain registration costs, or even the cost of a personal comput-
er.69 
B. Testing the 2006 Rules 
Chairwoman Ravel’s Statement of Reasons in Checks and Balances offered 
few particulars on why free Internet content should be regulated differently.70 
In light of the visceral response to her current and prior efforts to regulate po-
litical Internet content,71 it is unlikely that advanced details for a plan will be 
released.72  However, the trajectory of proposals to regulate Internet speech can 
be gleaned from Chairwoman Ravel’s votes in recent matters before the Com-
mission and her past record. In Checks and Balances, Ravel called on the 
Commission to reevaluate the 2006 Internet communications policies based on 
the general implication that changes in technology necessarily increase corrup-
tion, improper influence,73 and produce a nefarious lack of transparency in the 
democratic process.74 
                                                 
 69 See Advisory Op. 1998-22 (Leo Smith) at 2, 5 (“AO 1998-22”) (noting that a pre-
Internet exemption existed that called for calculating expenditures based on actual costs 
incurred by an individual to publish and maintain political website content). 
 70 SOR, Vice Chair Ravel at 1, MUR 6729 (“Some of my colleagues seem to believe 
that the same political message that would require disclosure if run on television should be 
categorically exempt from the same requirements when placed on the internet alone.”). 
 71 See Rudy Takala, Federal Election Commission to Consider Regulating Online Polit-
ical Speech, CNSNEWS.COM (Feb. 11, 2015, 10:15 AM), 
http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/rudy-takala/federal-election-commission-consider-
regulating-online-political-speech (noting the responses of Commissioners Goodman, 
Hunter, and Peterson). 
 72 See Laurel Rosenhall, Ann Ravel Describes Backlash to Comments On Online Politi-
cal Communication, THE SACRAMENTO BEE (Nov. 22, 2014 7:07 AM), 
http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article4053844.html (“Ravel 
said the point she initially made in written comments late last month generated a storm of 
backlash after Goodman did a television interview mischaracterizing her position”); see also 
Letter from Ann M. Ravel, Fed. Election Comm’n Vice Chair, to Editor, Wall St. J. (Nov. 5, 
2014) (declaring her Statement of Reasons in Checks and Balances had been mischaracter-
ized); see also Stephen Spaulding (@SpauldingCC), TWITTER (Feb. 11, 2015, 8:21 AM), 
https://twitter.com/SpauldingCC/status/565546214276743169 (“#FEC Chair @AnnMRavel 
explains that there is no proposal to ‘regulate the internet’ vis-a-vis politics - to say other-
wise is blatantly false ”).  
 73 Compare SOR, Vice Chair Ravel at 1-2, MUR 6729 (Checks and Balances) (“In do-
ing so, the Commission turned a blind eye to the Internet’s growing force in the political 
arena.”) with SOR, Chairman Goodman & Comm’rs. Hunter & Petersen at 5, MUR 6729 
(“Regrettably, the 3-to-3 vote in this matter suggests a desire to retreat from these important 
protections for online political speech – a shift in course that could threaten the continued 
development of the Internet’s virtual free marketplace of political ideas and democratic 
debate.”). 
 74 Ann M. Ravel, How Not to Enforce Campaign Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2014, at 
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The FEC recently addressed the issue of political Internet activity inde-
pendently conducted by individuals associated with campaigns or political 
committees.75  A complaint filed with the FEC alleged that an independent con-
tractor to a political committee violated the FECA for failing to report a web-
site he created to advocate the candidate he worked for.76  The Commission 
voted unanimously to dismiss the complaint, reasoning that the independent 
contractor was not authorized to generate web communications on behalf of 
the political committee.77 Further, the Commission found that the total cost 
associated with creating his site ($135), exceeded neither the threshold to qual-
ify as political committee activity ($1,000), nor the independent expenditure 
disclosure threshold ($250).78 
However, Commissioner Lee E. Goodman, then-Chairman of the FEC, em-
phasized in a Statement of Reasons accompanying the dismissal of that action, 
that the Commission did not need to reach those threshold questions because of 
the 2006 Internet freedom rules.79  Goodman’s statement provided a clear legal 
analysis of the Act and its derivative regulations that exclude uncompensated 
services and cost-free Internet activity from the broader reporting require-
ments.80 Goodman’s conclusion was that collateral affiliations to a campaign or 
political committee do not alter an individual’s First Amendment right to en-
gage in cost-free, independent speech posted on the Internet.81 
In December 2014, the Commission voted unanimously to dismiss another 
                                                                                                                 
A27 (“This transparency is vital to our democracy, and even more so after the Supreme 
Court yesterday struck down aggregate limits on political contributions.”); see, e.g., Dave 
Levinthal, New FEC Chief On ‘Dark Money’ Mission, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Dec. 17, 
2014), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2014/12/17/16527/new-fec-chief-dark-money-
mission (statement of Ann M. Ravel) (“Dark money is a broader problem...My passion is 
transparency.”); M.D. Kittle, ‘Activist At Heart’ Ann Ravel Takes Gavel at FEC, WATCH-
DOG.ORG (Jan. 15, 2014, 4:00 AM), http://watchdog.org/193057/ann-ravel-fec-campaign-
finance/ (statement of Ann M. Ravel) (“I understand that disclosure is a complicated topic 
and that in some ways disclosure of small donors may not be significant because what we 
want to know is who is influencing the elections so that we can make thoughtful deci-
sions.”). 
 75 See Judson Berger, FEC Backs Off Flirtation With Regulating Internet, 
FOXNEWS.COM (May 22, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/05/22/fec-backs-
off-flirtation-with-regulating-internet/ (indicating that Chairwoman Ravel had backed a 
motion to exclude “political activity on the internet” from any new regulations regarding 
contribution limits). 
 76 MUR 6578 (Doug LaMalfa Committee, et al.), Compl. at 1, (May. 16, 2012). 
 77 Factual & Legal Analysis at 9-10, MUR 6578 (Doug LaMalfa Committee, et al.) 
(“F&LA”). 
 78 Id. 
 79 Statement of Reasons, Chairman Goodman at 3-5, MUR 6578 (Doug LaMalfa Com-
mittee, et al.) [hereinafter SOR, Chairman Goodman, MUR 6578]. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 7. 
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complaint that alleged FECA violations stemming, in part, from Internet activi-
ties.82 This complaint alleged that the Internet activities of CREW, a non-profit 
group, including four press releases posted on the group’s website, an article 
appearing on a blog, and a mass email soliciting donations based on advocacy 
against a particular political candidate, violated the FECA for reporting fail-
ures.83 Three commissioners found the 2006 Internet exemption did not apply, 
but in this instance, it was inappropriate to dig into the minutia of dollars and 
cents spent in the course of participating in political discussion online.84 
Chairwoman Ravel and two of her colleagues concluded that further infor-
mation regarding the total cost of expenditures relating to these activities might 
be available, but that an inquiry into such matters in this case would be an inef-
ficient pursuit of the Commission’s purpose.85 This type of subjective applica-
tion of prosecutorial discretion is precisely what critics of regulating free polit-
ical Internet content fear and which is eliminated by the Internet freedom 
rules.86 
Concurring in the dismissal of the complaint against CREW, Commission-
ers Goodman and Caroline C. Hunter asserted the basis for applying the Inter-
net exemption.87 Their statement noted the alleged violation created by email 
solicitations, posting press releases, and third party blog posting of CREW’s 
messages, involved activities squarely within the 2006 regulation’s definition 
of Internet activities.88 The concurrence also acknowledged the record showed 
no compensation paid to CREW for posting these political comments,89 no 
compensation paid by CREW to have its commentary posted,90 and the associ-
ated expenditures reported for these activities did not reach the $1,000 thresh-
old,91 which would subject CREW to treatment as a political committee.92 
                                                 
 82 See Factual & Legal Analysis at 1-2, MUR 6795 (CREW) (“F&LA”) (showing that 
the committee had decided not to pursue the complaint any further). 
 83 MUR 6795 (CREW), Compl. at 5 (Dec. 17, 2014). 
 84 See F&LA at 1, 4-5, MUR 6795 (identifying possible instances where the exception 
most likely would not have applied while indicating that the commission had no intention to 
prosecute the matter). 
 85 Statement of Reasons, Chair Ravel, Comm’rs Walther & Weintraub at 1-2, MUR 
6795 (CREW) [hereinafter SOR, Chair Ravel, Comm’rs Walther & Weintraub, MUR 6795] 
(stating the position that the nature of the low-cost communications involved, a non-
exhaustive factual record, and efficiency, led the Commission to “exercise its prosecutorial 
discretion to dismiss this matter.”). 
 86 See supra notes 72-73. 
 87 Statement of Reasons, Comm’rs Goodman & Hunter at 4, MUR 6795 (CREW) [here-
inafter SOR, Comm’rs Goodman & Hunter, MUR 6795]. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 5-6. 
 91 Id. at 6-7. 
 92 See Id. at 6 (indicating that certain expenditures like administration fees, salary, pro-
duction, and overhead were not counted toward the $1000 threshold for political committee 
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The separate statements of reasons issued by the Commission present two 
views on the regulation of political speech. On the one hand, an objective ap-
plication of traditional anti-corruption goals to the Internet, and on the other, a 
subjective enforcement of violations based on the prerogative of any four-
person majority at the time of the FEC’s review. The prospect of ad hoc en-
forcement by subjective review is especially alarming when considering what 
some commissioners envision as the proper extent of regulated transparency. 
C. If it Ain’t Broke, Why Fix It? 
The motivation behind Chairwoman Ravel’s assessment that the relative 
production quality of some political internet content demands increased report-
ing requirements, is informed by her work in California.93 While serving as a 
commissioner on the California Fair Political Practices Commission 
(“CFPPC”),94 Ravel’s belief that advancements in technology create de facto 
impropriety in the democratic election process was evident when she pushed 
for increased rules governing political content on blogs, Twitter, Facebook, 
YouTube, and other websites.95 The rules approved by CFPPC in 2013 and the 
federal rules that require campaigns to disclose payments made for posting 
political Internet content are essentially the same.96 However, the rules Ravel 
                                                                                                                 
status). 
 93 See SOR, Vice Chair Ravel at 2, MUR 6729 (“Since its inception, this effort to pro-
tect individual bloggers and online commentators has been stretched to cover slickly-
produced ads aired solely on the Internet but paid for by the same organizations and the 
same large contributors as the actual ads aired on TV.”) (emphasis added). 
 94 Kittle, supra note 74 (statement of Ronald Rotunda, Former Commissioner of the 
CFPPC) (“When she talks about ‘dark money’ what she’s really talking about is trying to 
regulate the Internet, and she’s talked about it a lot.”); but see Rosenhall, supra note 72 
(statement of Ann M. Ravel) (“[A]ll I said was, ‘We need to be informed by the technolo-
gists and others, and then talk about it.’ That got turned into my colleague saying on Fox 
News that... I was trying to regulate the Internet.”). 
 95 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2 § 18421.5 (2015) (stating that additional reporting must be 
made to the public when a candidate or ballot measure pays for favorable or unfavorable 
reporting on a blog site or social media); see also Patrick McGreevy, New California Rules 
Aim for Transparency In Online Campaign Material, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2013), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-web-campaigns-20130920-story.html (indicating that 
the purpose of this new regulation was to better inform the public and to allow the public to 
evaluate the messages they receive on blogs and elsewhere online). 
 96 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2 § 18421.5; Internet Communications, 71 Fed. Reg. at 
18,602; see also Reid Wilson, California Campaigns Must Report Paying Bloggers, WASH. 
POST (Sept. 20, 2013) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2013/09/20/california-campaigns-must-
report-paying-bloggers/ (emphasizing that payment for the opinion of a candidate or ballot 
measure on a blog or social media not the nature of the opinion is essential for determining 
whether it must be disclosed). 
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proposed—which the CFPPC declined to adopt— are significant because they 
would require bloggers to carry the reporting burden for posting compensated 
political content.97 
Compensated content posted through any medium requires disclosure under 
the law.98 Imposing new regulations that create a shared burden of disclosure 
for individuals that post free political content on the Internet would be a depar-
ture from both the 2006 FEC Internet exemption and traditional anti-corruption 
campaign finance regulations.99  Such a broad reaching enforcement system 
creates substantial compliance burdens for individual Internet users.100 In fact, 
Chairwoman Ravel’s personal experiences with campaign contributions exem-
plify how difficult the implementation of dual-disclosure transparency can be 
in practice.101 
                                                 
 97 See Patrick McGreevy, California ethics czar urges disclosure of payments to Web 
pundits, L. A. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2012) [hereinafter McGreevy, California Ethics Czar], 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/20/local/la-me-blogs-20120420 (explaining that a blog-
gers anonymity would not exclude them from the law requiring disclosure of payment); see 
also Douglas McAlarney, Are Political Bloggers Weakening the Democratic Election Pro-
cess by Being Paid to Give You Their “Unbiased” Opinions, 41 FLA. ST. U.L. REV 511, 
533-34 (2014) (indicating that only one party—either the campaign or the blogger—is re-
quired to state that the blogger was paid to endorse or criticize a ballot measure or candi-
date); see also Wilson, supra note 96 (explaining that the rule passed by California’s state 
watchdog committee required the reporting of campaigns paying for favorable touting or 
slamming of a ballot or candidate). 
 98 See 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101, 30104. 
 99 See Internet Communications, 71 Fed. Reg. at 18,602 (“To require more of bloggers 
when others who receive payments from campaigns are not subject to similar disclosure 
requirements would not be fair.”); see also Quinn, supra note 63 (statement of Former FEC 
Chairman Goodman). 
If my organization wants to take out a banner ad or place an Internet video on a 
commercial website and pay a fee for that advertising space, the FEC regulates that 
expenditure just like it would a TV ad or radio ad. However, if an organization plac-
es content for free on the Internet, there is no expenditure to regulate because the 
dissemination cost is free. 
Id. 
 100 See Quinn, supra note 63. 
We would have to have a regulation prescribing what is described in production 
costs. The software that you purchased — and by the way, that goes for individual 
bloggers, too — up to computer, the software you purchased, your monthly Internet 
access charge. The FEC would have to get into this granular level of prescriptive 
regulation to tell people what to include in their expenditure reports to the FEC. 
Id. 
 101 See, e.g., Kittle, supra note 74 (discussing a 2006 campaign contribution made by 
Chairwoman Ravel, for which disclosure reports listed Ann Miller, her maiden name, and 
the generic profession of “attorney” was listed instead of her proper title of Santa Clara 
County Counsel at the time. Conceding that it was legal, but nonetheless controversial, un-
der Santa Clara laws for Ravel to simultaneously supply legal counsel to an incumbent 
elected official while making financial contributions to his campaign opponent, Ravel main-
tains that the campaign was solely responsible for misattributing her contribution); see also 
Robert Wilde, Erroneous Government Ethics Document Filed After FEC Chairman Ann 
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New political speech regulations are unnecessary because the 2006 Internet 
exemption established a fair and transparent forum for political speech. The 
impractical enforcement issues created by new rules also show that the only 
solution may be the current rules.102 Recent enforcement votes and the call for 
new regulations exhibit a refusal to acknowledge the proper scope of the 2006 
Internet freedom rules.103 However, the FEC’s ability to compel more disclo-
sure on the Internet exemplifies a broader disagreement over the legal extent of 
speech restrictions.104 
IV. THE FEC LACKS STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO REGULATE FREE 
INTERNET CONTENT 
Without the current Internet freedom rules, Twitter, Facebook, blogs, chat 
rooms, user-modified animated content like “Jib Jab,” and even the “Obama 
Girl” videos on YouTube, would be subject to FEC reporting requirements.105 
                                                                                                                 
Ravel Takes Lavish Weekend Trip, BREITBART.COM (Feb. 11, 2015), 
http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2015/02/11/ann-ravel-and-the-fec/ (highlighting a 
disclosure error Ravel made to the Office of Government Ethics, incorrectly listing a two-
day trip made in her capacity as Chairwoman, as a ten-day trip. Adding to the irony that the 
chief watchdog for campaign finance disclosure compliance - and a self described champion 
of transparency - erroneously filed an ethics document, is the fact that Ravel received a total 
travel subsidy of $1,417.37 for the two-day trip; which included a rental car valued at $160 
a day, roughly seven times the area average of $19-$25 per day, and which was paid for by 
the California Political Attorney Association (“CPAA”) while one or more of the CPAA’s 
attorneys were representing clients involved in hearings before the FEC). 
 102 von Spakovsky, supra note 66. 
There is no question that requiring government registration and reporting by the 
thousands of online bloggers, websites, commentators, podcasters, and kitchen table 
journalists and reporters would not only burden their First Amendment right to speak 
freely, but would be entirely impractical for the FEC. It simply does not have the re-
sources or time to regulate such voluminous activity—it is unfeasible, and would in-
variably lead to the charge of selective, politically motivated enforcement. 
Id. 
 103 SOR, Comm’rs Goodman & Hunter at 5, MUR 6795. 
 104 Jan Baran, Comment to Symposium: McCutcheon and the Future of Campaign Fi-
nance Regulation, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 4, 2014 2:59 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/04/symposium-mccutcheon-and-the-future-of-campaign-
finance-regulation (“[T]here are those who seek to minimize government intrusion into 
political speech and those who believe considerable government regulation is necessary to 
safeguard democracy and prevent corruption.”). 
 105 See Paul Bedard, Dems on FEC Move to Regulate Internet Campaigns, Blogs, 
Drudge, WASH. EXAMINER (Oct. 24, 2014, 8:26 PM), 
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/dems-on-fec-move-to-regulate-internet-campaigns-
blogs-drudge/article/2555270 (“FEC Chairman Lee E. Goodman, a Republican, said if regu-
lation extends that far, then anybody who writes a political blog, runs a politically active 
news site or even chat room could be regulated. He added that funny internet campaigns like 
“Obama Girl,” and “Jib Jab” would also face regulations.”). 
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The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”) as amended, charges 
the Commission with administering compliance and enforcement as well as 
formulating policies consistent with the Act.106 The Act also explicates that 
Congress’ authority supersedes the scope of the FEC’s authority to oversee any 
aspect of federal elections.107 The lower federal courts have repeatedly stated 
that the FEC is an agency of limited jurisdiction without the authority to make 
extra-statutory rules or assert a “roving plenary power” in the likeness of Con-
gress.108 Any new internet-related rule promulgated by the FEC must fit clearly 
within the confines of the FECA, yet the October 2014 ANPRM on Aggregate 
Biennial Contribution Limits suggest that the Commission would consider 
modifying existing rules or adding new rules in response to McCutcheon.109 
Ironically, the text of the ANPRM cites language from the McCutcheon opin-
ion that declares Congress as the proper authority to impose constitutionally 
valid alternative measures to prevent circumvention.110 
A. The Statutory Media Exemption and the Advent of the Kitchen Table 
Journalist 
The Commissions’ broader definition of “Internet activity” and the Internet 
exemption were born of out necessity and designed to reconcile a new com-
munications medium while honoring First Amendment speech rights. The 
“media exemption” is explicitly presented in the Act,111 and wholly consistent 
                                                 
 106 52 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(1) (“The Commission shall administer, seek to obtain compli-
ance with, and formulate policy with respect to, this Act and chapter 95 and chapter 96 of 
Title 26. The Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to the civil en-
forcement of such provisions.”). 
 107 52 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(2) (“Nothing in this Act shall be construed to limit, restrict, or 
diminish any investigatory, informational, oversight, supervisory, or disciplinary authority 
or function of the Congress or any committee of the Congress with respect to elections for 
Federal office.”) 
 108 The FEC is an agency of limited jurisdiction, and lacks any sort of roving plenary 
power to pass extra-statutory rules. To the extent that other avenues of constitutional regula-
tion exist, it is up to Congress- and Congress alone-to initiate such inquiries and collecting 
cases where the courts have defined the limited jurisdiction of the FEC. See, e.g., EMILY’s 
List v. FEC, 581 F.3d 1 (D.D.C. 2009) (stating that for the FEC to have any power the mon-
ey spent must be used for the “purpose” of influencing an election); see also, e.g., Unity’08 
v. FEC, 596 F.3d 861 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that draft groups are outside of the scope of 
the FEC and therefore the FEC does not have the power to regulate); see also, e.g., FEC v. 
Machinists Non-Partisan Political League, 655 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1981) 
 109 Aggregate Biennial Contributions Limits, 79 Fed. Reg. at 62,362. 
 110 Id. (“Although it held the aggregate limits to be unconstitutional, the Supreme Court 
indicated that there are multiple alternatives available to Congress that would serve the 
Government’s interest in preventing circumvention while avoiding ‘unnecessary abridg-
ment’ of First Amendment rights.”) (quoting McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1458) (internal 
quotation omitted). 
 111 52 U.S.C. § 30101(9)(B)(i) (“The term ‘expenditure’ does not include—any news 
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with First Amendment jurisprudence.112  However, it remains unsettled as to 
whether or not blogging and related social media activities qualify as journal-
ism.113 For now, blogging is generally considered exempt from the purview of 
the FEC because it falls into either the Internet exemption or the “media ex-
emption.”114  Without the 2006 Internet freedom rules, the Commission would 
have to determine if each blog with political commentary is subject to report-
ing and disclaimer requirements, or if it qualifies as a press entity subject to the 
media exemption. 
Regulating blogs as media creates a great challenge because the Internet has 
effectively given a printing press to anyone with access to a computer.115 
Scores of political bloggers, commentators, podcasters, and independent jour-
nalists utilize the Internet from the comfort of their kitchen table.116 Bloggers 
                                                                                                                 
story, commentary, or editorial distributed through the facilities of any broadcasting station, 
newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication, unless such facilities are owned or 
controlled by any political party, political committee, or candidate…”); see also 52 U.S.C. § 
30104 (f)(3)(B)(i) (“The term ‘electioneering communication’ does not include a communi-
cation appearing in a news story, commentary, or editorial distributed through the facilities 
of any broadcasting station, unless such facilities are owned or controlled by any political 
party, political committee, or candidate.”). 
 112 See First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 781 (1978) (emphasizing “the 
special and constitutionally recognized role of that institution informing and educating the 
public, offering criticism, and providing a forum for discussion and debate”); see also Lov-
ell v. City of Griffin, Ga., 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938). 
The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily 
embraces pamphlets and leaflets. These indeed have been historic weapons in the de-
fense of liberty, as the pamphlets of Thomas Paine and others in our own history 
abundantly attest. The press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of 
publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion. 
Id. 
 113 Compare Agnes Poirer, Blogging is Not Journalism, THE GUARDIAN, (Mar. 21, 2006, 
5:43 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2006/mar/21/blogisnotjournalism 
(contending that blogging is a habit and journalism is a profession that requires research) 
with Robinson Meyer, U.S. Court: Bloggers Are Journalists: Even When They’re Libeling 
You, THE ATLANTIC, (Jan. 21, 2014, 11:45 AM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/01/us-court-bloggers-are-
journalists/283225/ (explaining that bloggers are journalists when it comes to their first 
amendment rights, and it is difficult to make a distinction between “journalists” that are 
“media respondents” and “non –institutional respondents”). 
 114 See Internet Communications and Activity, FED. ELECTION COMM’N (Jun. 2007), 
http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/internetcomm.shtml#press (“Whether covered by the 
media exemption or the individual activity exemption, blogging will generally not be sub-
ject to FEC regulation.”). 
 115 See Quinn, supra note 63 (statement of Former FEC Commissioner Goodman) (“The 
Internet has placed a printing press in the hands of every citizen in America. and many small 
groups and individuals have started political commentary pages or websites on their kitchen 
tables and have grown those blogs into being significant daily publications”). 
 116 von Spakovsky, supra note 66. 
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and podcasters that focus on political content serve an indistinguishable pur-
pose from the role of the press as the Supreme Court has defined it; bloggers 
seek to inform and educate the public, offer criticism, and provide a forum for 
discussion and debate.117 
To justify the view that these contributions to the discussion are inapposite 
to the constitutionally protected role of the press, proponents of regulating 
cost-free political Internet content rely on conjectures of the corruptibility of 
bloggers.118 Yet, the alleged undisclosed quid pro quo payments for favorable 
blogging coverage would already violate the Act if they could be proved.119 
Publishing free Internet content that aims to influence political discussion pre-
sents no evidence of corruption as defined by the Act, therefore there is no ba-
sis for the FEC to regulate such content without universally rejecting the jour-
nalistic role of Internet commenters and obscuring the protections of the media 
exemption. 
The second justification for regulating blogs separately from traditional me-
dia relies on the false notion that any influence is an improper influence.120 The 
FECA includes no provision limiting the scope of a journalist’s influence, and 
the Commission and the courts have repeatedly enforced the intent of Congress 
that any and all forms of media enjoy the unfettered right to cover and com-
ment on political campaigns.121 
                                                 
 117 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 781 (“The press cases emphasize the special and constitutionally 
recognized role of that institution in informing and educating the public, offering criticism, 
and providing a forum for discussion and debate.”). 
 118 See Rotunda, supra note 68 (describing Ravel’s persistent allegations that “dark mon-
ey” is influencing political Internet content, despite her inability to cite a single example 
following CFPPC hearings that found no evidence to justify regulating bloggers potential 
connections to policies or politicians they support); see also McAlarney, supra note 97, at 
527-31 (leaving the question presented in the article’s title unanswered with mere sugges-
tions and unconfirmed allegations that influential bloggers receive payment for favorable 
coverage). 
 119 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)-(9). 
 120 See McGreevy, California Ethics Czar, supra note 97 (stating Ravel’s intent to regu-
late an anonymous blogger that “draws attention to criminal charges pending against Los 
Angeles City Councilman Richard Alarcon”); see also McAlarney, supra note 97, at 533 
(citing the opinion of founder and publisher of the Daily Kos, that left-leaning bloggers 
were invited to a breakfast at the Democratic National Convention in order to get the party’s 
message directly to its constituents and potential constituents). 
 121 Advisory Op. 2014-06, (Ryan for Congress) at 2-3 (“AO 2014-06”). 
The legislative history of the media exemption indicates that Congress did not intend 
to limit or burden in any way the First Amendment freedoms of the press and of as-
sociation. The exemption assures the unfettered right of the newspapers, TV net-
works, and other media to cover and comment on political campaigns. Consistent 
with the Act’s legislative history, the Commission and courts have recognized media 
covered by the exemption to include magazines, newsletters, cartoons, cable televi-
sion, the Internet, webcasts, satellite broadcasts, documentary films, radio talk 
shows, and even rallies staged and broadcast by a radio talk show. The Commission 
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It is unsurprising that certain Commissioners seek to regulate putative media 
content on political blogs and podcasts given that three current FEC members 
may not recognize the validity of the statutory press exemption at all.122  A 
complaint filed with the FEC during the 2012 elections alleged that a Boston 
news station violated the Federal Election Campaign Act by making an illegal 
campaign contribution equal to the amount of programming production costs, 
when it invited two candidates to participate in a televised 30 minute debate 
during regular Sunday morning news programming.123 The complaint alleged 
that the violation existed because the television broadcasting network, WCVB, 
failed to invite a third-party candidate.124 The Commission unanimously dis-
missed the complaint for lack of a violation, but there was no consensus in 
their underlying analysis.125 Three commissioners voted to dismiss the com-
plaint based on an analysis of FEC regulations, including the objectiveness of 
the television station’s criteria for limiting the debate.126 The remaining three 
commissioners issued a Statement of Reasons that confronted the complaint as 
a jurisdictional matter, finding that the FEC did not have authority to regulate 
editorial decisions made by journalists.127 As a broadcasting television station, 
                                                                                                                 
has not limited the press exemption to traditional news outlets, but rather has applied 
it to ‘news stories, commentaries, and editorials, no matter in what medium they are 
published. 
Id. (internal quotations, alterations and footnotes omitted). 
 122 See Certification at 1, MUR 6703 (WCVB-TV) (reflecting the votes of Commission-
ers Ravel, Walther, and Weintraub to disregard the press exemption in the Commission’s 
analysis and conclusion that there was no FECA violation); see also Are FEC Commission-
ers Rethinking The Scope of the Media Exemption?, HOLTZMAN, VOGEL, JOSEFIAK, PLLC., 
(Jan. 19, 2011), http://www.hvjlaw.com/2011/01/are-fec-commissioners-rethinking-the-
scope-of-the-media-exemption/ (discussing the view of a law firm specializing in election 
law and compliance on a 2011 FEC enforcement matter in which a TV and Radio personali-
ty solicited campaign contributions for a candidate by email. Commissioners Walther and 
Weintraub, who remain on the Commission in 2015, voted to pursue enforcement of the 
alleged violation because they did not find that the emails fell under the media exemption, 
which allows media figures to solicit contributions). 
 123 MUR 6703 (WCVB-TV), Compl. at 2-3 (Nov. 28, 2012). 
 124 See id. (explaining that the channel that hosted the debate did nothing improper by 
requiring a fundraising minimum to be in the debate, even though a third party candidate 
had not reached that minimum); see also Goodman, Feds Flirt With TV, supra note 24 (dis-
cussing the Commission’s internal disagreement on this enforcement matter as symptomatic 
of a larger debate on regulatory overreach). 
 125 See Certification at 1, MUR 6703 (WCVB-TV) (reflecting the votes of Commission-
ers Ravel, Walther, and Weintraub to disregard the press exemption in the Commission’s 
analysis and conclusion that there was no FECA violation). 
 126 See Factual & Legal Analysis at 6, MUR 6703 (WCVB-TV) (“F&LA”) (indicating 
that the commissioners did not believe that the criteria for the debate was done in a way to 
purposely exclude one of the candidates). 
 127 See Statement of Reasons, Vice Chair Goodman, Comm’rs. Hunter & Petersen at 3-4, 
MUR 6703 (WCVB-TV) [hereinafter SOR, Vice Chair Goodman, Comm’rs. Hunter & Pe-
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WCVB is a press entity by precedent and the plain language of the statute, and 
the Act does “not define the issues permitted to be discussed or the format in 
which they are to be presented under the ‘commentary’ exemption nor do they 
set a time limit as to the length of the commentary.”128 
If the journalistic contributions of political content on the Internet are 
properly recognized within the media exemption, the Supreme Court’s state-
ment that “[t]here is simply no support for the view that the First Amendment, 
as originally understood, would permit the suppression of political speech by 
media corporations,” should protect the journalistic commentary of bloggers 
and podcasters.129 The distinctions barring regulation of format and content 
noted in the Vice Chair’s WCVB statement130 are logically applicable to blog-
ging or podcasting political Internet content, where myriad forms and issue 
focuses are posted at the editorial discretion of the commenter. Thus, to review 
Internet political commentary on the merits of its content and format is a com-
plete disregard for the statutory protection of the role of the media as provided 
by the Act. 
B. The Quid Pro Quo Corruption Defined by the Act does Not Exist in Pure 
Political Speech 
The Commission’s authority does not extend to policing the vast cost-free 
forum of political discussion on the Internet.131 Rather, the FEC’s statutory au-
thority is limited to preventing quid pro quo corruption or the appearance of 
corruption.132 Within the Act’s definitions, “independent expenditure[s]” sub-
                                                                                                                 
tersen, MUR 6703] (stating that some commissioners believed they should not take on the 
issue due to the FEC’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction). 
 128 See id. at 4 (explaining that the press is within its rights to use a debate format to 
convey information to the public). 
 129 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 353; see Freedom Partners Chamber of Commerce & 
Freedom Partners Action Fund, Comment Letter on Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing on Aggregate Biennial Contribution Limits at 12 (Jan. 15, 2015), [hereinafter FPCC & 
FPAF Comments], http://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=313005 (“Ultimately, the 
so-called ‘media exemption’ is not simply a statutory carve out, provided simply by the 
benevolence of Congress.”). 
 130 See SOR, Vice Chair Goodman, Comm’rs. Hunter & Peterson at 3-4, MUR 6703 
(discussing how Commissioners Hunter and Peterson believed that the FEC has no legal 
authority to “regulate the editorial decisions of journalist”). 
 131 Cf. Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 
(1963) (“Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government 
may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity.” (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 
U.S. 296, 311 (1940)). 
 132 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357 (“Limits on independent expenditures…have a 
chilling effect extending well beyond the Government’s interest in preventing quid pro quo 
corruption. The anticorruption interest is not sufficient to displace the speech here in ques-
tion.”). 
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ject to reporting are those made by an individual that expressly advocate “the 
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate; and that [are] not made in 
concert or cooperation with or at the request or suggestion of such candidate, 
the candidate’s authorized political committee, or their agents, or a political 
party committee or its agents.”133  Therefore, mere allegations of issue advoca-
cy, coverage that is favorable to a particular candidate by a putative Internet 
press entity, or a Commissioner’s relative assessments of “slickly-produced 
ads,”134 are not sufficient for the FEC to assert its authority without a showing 
of quid pro quo corruption.135 
According to proponents of regulating free political Internet content, such 
corruption exists where unreported contributions and expenditures are made in 
exchange for control over political Internet content.136 Yet—despite these ar-
guments—even if contributions and expenditures made by political committees 
and campaigns could have the ability to create pervasive influence across polit-
ical Internet content, the Act provides the proper scope of the FEC’s authority 
to regulate such conduct.137 Under the Act’s provisions, independent expendi-
tures that exceed $250 require an expenditure report by any individual that is 
not a political committee.138 This means the Commission is congressionally 
authorized to oversee political Internet commentary by individuals who spend 
more than $250 to expressly advocate a candidate.  Whether the $250 threshold 
is consistent with constitutional jurisprudence that calls for scrutiny of “large 
contributions” for the impact they may have in receiving return action in kind 
                                                 
 133 52 U.S.C. § 30101(17). 
 134 See SOR, Vice Chair Ravel at 2, MUR 6729 (indicating the Internet is a major source 
of political funding and has become the home of slickly produced political ads). 
 135 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359 (“When Buckley identified a sufficiently im-
portant governmental interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, that 
interest was limited to quid pro quo corruption.”); see also Davis, 554 U.S. at 741 (stating in 
an opinion that also struck the disclosure requirements of the so-called “Millionaires 
Amendment,” the Court held that “[p]reventing corruption or the appearance of corruption 
are the only legitimate and compelling government interests thus far identified for restricting 
campaign finances.”) (internal quotations and alterations omitted). 
 136 Daniel W. Butrymowicz, Loophole.com: How the FEC’s Failure to Fully Regulate 
the Internet Undermines Campaign Finance Law, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1708, 1732-40 
(2009). 
 137 See 52 U.S.C. § 30104(c)(1) (“Every person (other than a political committee) who 
makes independent expenditures in an aggregate amount or value in excess of $250 during a 
calendar year shall file a statement containing the information required under subsection 
(b)(3)(A) for all contributions received by such person.”); See also 52 U.S.C. § 30101(4)(A) 
(“any committee, club, association, or other group of persons which receives contributions 
aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year or which makes expenditures aggre-
gating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year”). 
 138 See 52 U.S.C. § 30104(c)(1). 
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is a separate issue.139 Nonetheless, the Act is clear: if an individual spends less 
than $250 to advocate, criticize, or comment on a political candidate, the FEC 
has no authority to regulate that individual’s conduct. 
Without going full circle to the analysis which produced the Internet exemp-
tion, it suffices to say that any accounting evaluation of expenditures related to 
posting political Internet content, i.e. the de minimis costs of using YouTube, 
creating a blog, Tweeting, or even procuring Internet access would strain to 
reach the $250 bar in 2015.140 Assuming arguendo that in 2015 individuals 
have free access to computers and the Internet as a result of unrelated needs or 
through public access, the FEC lacks authority to regulate activity for which an 
individual incurs no cost.141  If the Commission expanded its cost analysis to 
include the purchase of a home computer, the table the commenter sits at, or 
the coffee she drinks while posting at all hours of the night, these line items 
would be wholly inconsistent with the Act’s purpose of ferreting out large con-
tributions prone to garner an in-kind response from political candidates.142 Fur-
ther, such analysis would break with the Commission’s own interpretation of 
the Act over the last twenty years to include “personal volunteer activity” as 
exempt from regulation.143 
The FEC was created to prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption 
in the democratic election process.144 The Commission’s statutory mandate is 
                                                 
 139 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27 (“To the extent that large contributions are given to se-
cure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our 
system of representative democracy is undermined.”). 
 140 See F&LA at 9, MUR 6578 (showing that the cost of creating a website did not come 
to the $250 minimum threshold for being required to be disclosed); see also AO 1998-22, at 
5 (accounting an individual’s costs related to publishing an unauthorized candidate advoca-
cy website as less than $250). 
 141 See 52 U.S.C. § 30101(17) (“The term “independent expenditure” means an expendi-
ture by a person…” (emphasis added); see also SOR, Comm’rs. Goodman & Hunter at 5 n. 
21, MUR 6795 (“For there to be an “independent expenditure” there must be an “expendi-
ture” as defined by the Act and Commission regulations.”). 
 142 EFF & CDT Comments at 1, Aggregate Biennial Contribution Limits (“Unlike politi-
cal advertisements in the offline world, the Internet is not merely a tool of the wealthy polit-
ical elite. Ordinary individuals can purchase Internet ads, create YouTube videos, and post 
banners on their personal websites to express support for particular candidates or parties—
all for little or no cost.”). 
 143 See Advisory Op. 1999-17 (George W. Bush for President) at 5 (“AO 1999-17”); see 
also 11 C.F.R §§ 100.74, 100.75, 100.79 (addressing individual volunteer contributions of 
time and the resources of homes and vehicles as exempt). 
 144 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26; see Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 
652, 660 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (providing a now abrogated 
governmental interest in preventing “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggre-
gations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have 
little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas,” that is 
nevertheless wholly inapplicable to restricting individual political commentary on the Inter-
net). 
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not—and has never been—to regulate speech for the sake of regulating 
speech.145 Contributing to the political discussion by posting commentary on 
the Internet for free represents pure speech that is unquestionably protected by 
the First Amendment and uninhibited by the provisions of the Federal Election 
Campaign Act. To regulate free Internet content because it involves political 
commentary is outside of the FEC’s authority, and any statutory provision that 
called for the FEC to compel disclosure and disclaimer of pure speech would 
violate the Constitution. 
V. REGULATING PURE SPEECH CONTENT ON SOCIAL MEDIA AND 
BLOGS IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
Calls to regulate political content on the Internet and the Commission’s Ad-
vance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on McCutcheon’s abrogation of bienni-
al campaign contribution limits are not coincidental.146 The underlying premise 
of expanding campaign finance regulations is that financial resources are in-
herently corruptive and must be restricted wherever money may be present.147 
This premise was rejected by McCutcheon, which emphasized that mere con-
jecture is inadequate to carry a First Amendment burden.148 The flaws of this 
premise are typically exposed by the specific identification of a particular 
group or viewpoint and the assumption that financial resources spent advocat-
ing that viewpoint, are alone, evidence of corruption outside the protections of 
the First Amendment.149  The risks of accepting this premise in the context of 
                                                 
 145 See Goodman, Online Political Opinions, supra note 5 (“[T]he FEC has no authority 
to regulate political speech for the sake of limiting speech, but only with regard to large 
monetary contributions and expenditures with corruptive potential.”). 
 146 See Aggregate Biennial Contribution Limits, 79 Fed. Reg. at 62,361; see also SOR, 
Vice Chair Ravel at 2, MUR 6729. 
 147 Compare SOR, Vice Chair Ravel at 2, MUR 6729 (“[the Internet is] a major source 
of political advertising — dominated by the same political organizations that dominate tradi-
tional media.”); with Rotunda, supra note 68. 
The theory behind limiting political campaign contributions is the fear that a con-
tributor might secure special access to an officeholder or secure his, or his succes-
sor’s, secret promise to vote for or against a piece of legislation. This fear does not 
apply when someone is arguing publicly for or against a law, regardless of who may 
or may not have paid him to do so. 
Id. 
 148 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452 (“[W]e ‘have never accepted mere conjecture as 
adequate to carry a First Amendment burden.’” (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t 
PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 392 (2000))). 
 149 Compare Levinthal, supra note 74 (statement of Ann M. Ravel on the issues of re-
porting and disclaimers) (“Dark money is a broader problem”), and Ann M. Ravel 
(@AnnMRavel), TWITTER (Jan. 29, 2014, 7:51 AM), 
https://twitter.com/AnnMRavel/status/560827579486044162 (citing social media post by 
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an Internet speech rule arise from discretionary applications of the rule on a 
selective and highly partisan basis.150 
The fundamental right of free speech is imperiled most where the govern-
ment attempts to restrict speech purely on the basis of what is said and who 
says it.151  As the Supreme Court recently recognized, disagreement with the 
content of political speech is irrelevant to speech rights.152 The laws and regula-
tions of campaign finance do not authorize the censorship of some to the bene-
fit of others.153  Stated differently, the FEC cannot enforce bare censorship be-
cause the government is not endowed to moderate the people’s discussion of 
government.154 
Would-be Internet speech regulators know this, and so they recast their in-
terest as an effort to prevent corruption, but without consideration of the limit-
ing principles recognized since Buckley.155  Chairwoman Ravel’s statement in 
Checks and Balances displayed her concern for “the Internet’s growing force 
                                                                                                                 
Chairwoman Ravel linking a story titled “How Dark Money Flows through the Koch Net-
work”), with Kittle, supra note 74 (statement of Ronald Rotunda, Former Commissioner of 
the CFPPC) (“[W]hen she talks about ‘dark money’ what she’s really talking about is trying 
to regulate the Internet, and she’s talked about it a lot.”). 
 150 See Chuck Ross, FEC Democrats Opposed Republican’s Appeal But Supported 
Democrats’, THE DAILY CALLER (Feb. 11, 2015 10:31 AM), 
http://dailycaller.com/2015/02/11/fec-democrat-opposed-republicans-appeal-but-supported-
democrats/; see also Goodman, Feds Flirt With TV, supra note 24 (describing recent exam-
ples of partisan enforcement application by the Commission over the past several years). 
 151 Cf. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340-41 (“As instruments to censor, these categories 
are interrelated: Speech restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too often 
simply a means to control content. . .[but] [t]he First Amendment protects speech and 
speaker, and the ideas that flow from each.”); see also CHAIRMAN DARRELL ISSA, STAFF 
REPORT, H  COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV’T REFORM, HOW POLITICS LED THE IRS TO 
TARGET CONSERVATIVE TAX-EXEMPT APPLICANTS FOR THEIR POLITICAL BELIEFS 2 (2014), 
http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/How-Politics-Led-to-the-IRS-
Targeting-Staff-Report-6.16.14.pdf (“Freedom of speech . . . [is a right] so fundamental to 
American citizens that [it is] enshrined in the First Amendment of the Constitution’s Bill of 
Rights (citation omitted).”).  
 152 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340 (“Prohibited, too, are restrictions distinguishing 
among different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others.” (citing Bellotti, 435 
U.S. at 784 (1978))). 
 153 Id. 
 154 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777 n.12 (“speech concerning public affairs is more than 
self-expression; it is the essence of self-government” (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 
U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964))). 
 155 See Lachlan Markay, FEC Republicans Vow to Fight Regulations on Online Political 
Speech, WASH. FREE BEACON (Oct. 28, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://freebeacon.com/issues/fec-
republicans-vow-to-fight-regulations-on-online-political-speech (statement of FEC Com-
missioner Goodman) (“The problem is that Ravel’s approach to the issue contains “no limit-
ing principle. . . In attempting to crack down on those “slickly-produced ads,” the FEC 
could ensnare countless Internet users who simply communicate their political views 
online.”). 
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in the political arena.”156 Although Chairwoman Ravel’s voting record reflects 
an interpretation that rejects the FEC’s Internet and Media exemptions,157 the 
explicit rejection of McCutcheon in her statement cannot be dismissed as mere 
interpretation.158 That political Internet commentary might influence elections 
or elected officials is not a sufficient governmental interest to impinge upon a 
constitutional right.159 
Exercising pure speech at de minimis cost on the Internet presents no dis-
cernible threat as an “effort to control the exercise of an officeholder’s official 
duties.”160 The projected corruption alleged by the influence of the Internet is 
uncorroborated by any evidence recorded by the FEC that the existing laws are 
inadequate, being circumvented, or that substantial compliance issues exist.161 
Absent evidence of this perceived or imagined corruption, the unlimited pur-
suit preventing influence as de facto corruption of elected officials and candi-
dates has no constitutional basis. 
Forcing disclosure of Internet-based political speech would also create sub-
stantial burdens to speakers, and therefore reduce speech.162 The Buckley Court 
                                                 
 156 SOR, Vice Chair Ravel at 1-2, MUR 6729 (“[T]he Commission turned a blind eye to 
the Internet’s growing force in the political arena.”). 
 157 See, e.g., Lee Goodman, The FEC’s Problems Aren’t with the GOP, POLITICO (May 
10, 2015), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/05/the-fecs-problems-arent-with-
the-gop-117798.html#.Vd-7MPlViko (citing instances of FEC Chairwoman Ann Ravel’s 
recent voting history within the Commission). 
 158 David A. Graham, What Use Are Campaign-Finance Laws If They’re Not Enforced?, 
THE ATLANTIC (May 8, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/05/what-
use-are-campaign-finance-laws-if-theyre-not-enforced/392621/. 
 159 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1450-51. 
Spending large sums of money in connection with elections, but not in connection 
with an effort to control the exercise of an officeholder’s official duties, does not 
give rise to such quid pro quo corruption. Nor does the possibility that an individual 
who spends large sums may garner “influence over or access to” elected officials or 
political parties … the Government may not seek to limit the appearance of mere in-
fluence or access. 
Id. 
 160 Id. at 1450. 
 161 von Spakovsky, supra note 66. 
There is no evidence in the record that the current regulations are inadequate, that 
they are being circumvented, or that there are substantial problems with noncompli-
ance. Without such evidence, any changes in the applicable regulations, particularly 
any further limiting of constitutionally protected political activity would be arbitrary 
and capricious, a clear and obvious violation of the Chevron standard. 
Id. 
 162 Id. 
It would create a huge group of violators who would have no idea that there was a 
reporting requirement, much less how to do it correctly. Such regulation could end 
up “seriously restricting participation in the democratic process,” something the Su-
preme Court warned against in McCutcheon. It would raise the dire specter of a fed-
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recognized the significant deterrent effect of compelled disclosure as the basis 
for requiring strict scrutiny where First Amendment rights are at risk.163 In Da-
vis v. Federal Election Commission, the Supreme Court restated its recognition 
of the significant consequences compelled disclosure have on privacy of asso-
ciation and belief.164  Expanding Internet speech restrictions would require in-
dividuals to consider legal consequences, if not obtain counsel, before posting 
political commentary on social media.165 The desire to voice a political opinion 
would suddenly be strangled by the uncertainty of a commenter’s obligations 
and the fear of serious legal repercussions.166 
Political speech regulations would also benefit wealthy donors, because they 
have the resources to establish tax-exempt 501(c) and 527 organizations.167  
Creating a non-profit entity to provide political advocacy is a daunting task and 
requires overcoming a significant barrier to the plain exercise of the First 
Amendment. 168  It is hard to imagine George Soros, Michael Bloomberg, or 
Sheldon Adelson vigorously typing away on their Twitter feed, “liking” a Fa-
cebook post, or having the inclination to make the “Obama Girl” YouTube 
video. But average citizens do participate in the political discussion in those 
                                                                                                                 
eral agency monitoring everything that is being said on the Internet, something that 
should scare every American (footnote omitted). 
Id. 
 163 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 65 (“[E]ven if any deterrent effect on the exercise of First 
Amendment rights arises, not through direct government action, but indirectly as an unin-
tended but inevitable result of the government’s conduct in requiring disclosure.” (citing 
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 461)). 
 164 Davis, 554 U.S. at 727 (“[C]ompelled disclosure, in itself, can seriously infringe on 
privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment” (quoting Buckley, 
424 U.S. at 64)). 
 165 Coolidge-Reagan Found. & Conservative Action Fund, Comment Letter on Ad-
vanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Aggregate Biennial Contribution Limits at 9 
(Jan. 15. 2015), [hereinafter CRF & CAF Comments] (“Ordinary citizens would have to 
pore over technical regulations, consult with a specialized campaign finance attorney, or 
seek an advisory opinion from the FEC to determine whether their social media updates, 
blog postings, e-mails, or websites are legal, contain any necessary disclaimers, or trigger 
any additional disclosure requirements.”); cf., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 324. (“The First 
Amendment does not permit laws that force speakers to retain a campaign finance attorney . 
. . before discussing the most salient political issues of our day.”). 
 166 See e.g., Goodman, Feds Flirt With TV, supra note 24 (describing the penalties for 
violating corporate contribution regulations, “people who make them face stiff fines, injunc-
tions, and can even go to prison”). 
 167 See generally GREG J. SCOTT & ZAINAB S. SMITH, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, FEC CAM-
PAIGN GUIDE: POLITICAL PARTY COMMITTEES (2013), 
http://www.fec.gov/pdf/partygui.pdf#search=501%20c. 
 168 See Jill Havlat, How Much Money Do You Need to Start a Nonprofit, NONPROFIT HUB, 
http://www.nonprofithub.org/starting-a-nonprofit/how-much-money-do-you-need-to-start-a-
nonprofit/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2015) (explaining the process of setting up a nonprofit and 
the filing fees that are involved.). 
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ways.169  Creating a barrier that enhances the speech of one segment of society 
by restricting others has been has roundly rejected by the Supreme Court.170 
Additionally, restricting political Internet speech would shine a substantial 
light onto the personal lives of political Internet commenters. McIntyre v. Ohio 
Elections Commission announced the importance of anonymity inherent in the 
First Amendment, going so far as to assign it the “honorable tradition of advo-
cacy and dissent…a shield from the tyranny of the majority.”171 Disclosure re-
quirements would subject individuals to revealing their telephone number and 
address without a scintilla of corruption implicated by the desire to voice a 
political opinion online.172 Therefore, increased regulation of political Internet 
activity is certain to cause less political Internet activity,173 and as Justice Ken-
nedy wrote in Citizens United, “political speech must prevail against the laws 
that would suppress it, whether by design or inadvertence.”174 The Internet de-
mands exactly the breathing room the Court referenced in NAACP v. Button, 
                                                 
 169 See Daniela V. Dimitrova et al., The Effects Of Digital Media On Political 
Knowledge And Participation In Election Campaigns: Evidence From Panel Data, 41 
COMM. RES. 95, 96-97 (2014) (discussing the growth of social media in recent years and the 
importance that candidates utilize these tools to reach potential voters.). 
 170 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49 (“[The] concept that government may restrict the speech 
of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly 
foreign to the First Amendment.”). 
 171 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357. 
Under our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a pernicious, fraudulent 
practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent. Anonymity is a 
shield from the tyranny of the majority…It thus exemplifies the purpose behind the 
Bill of Rights, and of the First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular indi-
viduals from retaliation—and their ideas from suppression—at the hand of an intol-
erant society. 
Id.; contra, John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 221 (2010) (Scalia, J. concurring) (“Our 
Nation’s longstanding traditions of legislating and voting in public refute the claim that the 
First Amendment accords a right to anonymity in the performance of an act with govern-
mental effect.”). 
 172 EFF & CDT Comments at 2, Aggregate Biennial Contribution Limits (“The Commis-
sion should not force individuals to disclose sensitive personal information—such as an 
address or telephone number—without a clear need for the information in order to address 
an overt threat to the integrity of the campaign finance system.”). 
 173 See CRF & CAF Comments at 10, Aggregate Biennial Contribution Limits (“Mecha-
nistically applying twentieth-century standards for paper, radio, and television communica-
tions to this fundamentally different medium threatens to strangle this crucial channel for 
political discourse, chill a tremendous amount of political speech by ordinary Americans.”); 
see also Quinn, supra note 63. 
The specter of regulation of Internet political speech will discourage small groups 
and individuals from using the Internet to express their political opinions. If we regu-
late it, we will necessarily discourage it and get less of it. It’s an axiom that if you 
regulate it, you will deter it and get less of it. 
Id. 
 174 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 312. 
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and established by current FEC regulations.175 The prospect of regulating free 
political Internet content does not overcome even statutory construction, let 
alone show a compelling government interest required by strict scrutiny.176 
VI. TILTING AT WINDMILLS: THE FALSE PREMISE OF THE 
GOVERNING CLASS ENGENDERS FEAR TO INCREASE THEIR OWN 
AUTHORITY 
The contradiction of regulating speech through money is that increasing the 
authority of regulators—especially unelected regulators—effectively creates an 
imbalance of influence to favor political speakers with the greatest resources. 
By imposing limits on all speech, individual speakers face greater costs and 
barriers to freely voicing opinions, while speakers with substantial resources 
maintain the necessary influence to steer the expanded bureaucratic authority 
or to afford the legal mechanisms of efficient compliance. This imbalance is 
amplified by the incentive of those in power to dictate the rules of the demo-
cratic contest in their own favor.177 
A. Engendering Fear with The Corruption Windmill 
Controlling speech by regulating free political Internet content has been ob-
served as a “solution in search of a problem.”178 The accusation that dark mon-
                                                 
 175 See EFF & CDT Comments at 2, Aggregate Biennial Contribution Limits (“Political 
speech on the Internet demands substantial breathing space to ensure robust online debate. 
The Commission’s current—and narrow—regulatory approach provides such breathing 
space and thereby ensures that campaign finance laws do not chill the online speech of the 
millions of ordinary people who communicate about politics online.”). 
 176 Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011) (“Because the Act im-
poses a restriction on the content of protected speech, it is invalid unless California can 
demonstrate that it passes strict scrutiny—that is, unless it is justified by a compelling gov-
ernment interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest.” (citing R.A.V., 505 U.S., at 
395)). 
 177 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (“No man is allowed to be a judge in his 
own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, 
corrupt his integrity.”). 
 178 FPCC & FPAF Comments at 3, Aggregate Biennial Contribution Limits (“Equally 
troubling is the disingenuousness in the presentation of amounts spent in connection with 
elections, presumably to create a “problem” in need of a “solution.”); see also Adam B, 
California Starts Regulating Political Blogging. Why?, DAILY KOS (Sept. 20, 2013, 9:34 
AM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/09/20/1240155/-California-starts-regulating-
political-blogging-Why. 
What, exactly, is the problem that this is intended to solve? Has California state and 
local politics been overrun by covert, deceptive online activity? Are citizens bam-
boozled on a regular basis?... But it’s still a solution in search of a problem. There 
are a lot of issues dealing with the role of money in politics which legislators and 
regulators ought to be addressing, with the goal of reducing the corrupting influence 
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ey and political speech expenditures corrupt democracy are not unique to the 
Internet. President Obama incorrectly predicted in his 2010 State of the Union 
address that a stampede of money would flood elections after Citizens Unit-
ed.179 Chairwoman Ravel likewise misrepresents reality by alleging that dark 
money is flooding the political arena on the Internet.180  The view that the mon-
ey and  influence of political organizations and large contributors represents 
quid pro quo corruption on traditional media and the Internet is factually incor-
rect.181 Further, this claim has no standing as a violation of the First Amend-
ment.182 
According to the FEC, roughly $7 billion dollars was spent toward the 2012 
election cycle183 and nearly $4 billion was spent in 2014.184 But the underlying 
numbers tell a different, more important story about the influence of anony-
mous donations. In 2012, only $300 million of the $7 billion was spent by non-
profit organizations.185 Much like individuals who currently post free political 
                                                                                                                 
of amassed wealth on elections. This wasn’t one of them. 
Id. 
 179 Baran, supra note 104 (“In his 2010 State of the Union address, President Obama 
personally lectured members of the Court and predicted a “stampede” of money resulting 
from that decision…The amount of money spent in subsequent elections rose, although at a 
rate no higher than in preceding elections.”). 
 180 Levinthal, supra note 74 (statement of FEC Vice Chair Ann Ravel) (“Dark money is 
a broader problem…It’s not a partisan question for me.”). 
 181 SOR, Vice Chair Ravel at 2, MUR 6729. 
But the Commission failed to take into account clear indicators that the Internet 
would become a major source of political advertising – dominated by the same polit-
ical organizations that dominate traditional media. Since its inception, this effort to 
protect individual bloggers and online commenters has been stretched to cover slick-
ly produced ads aired solely on the Internet but paid for by the same organizations 
and the same large contributors as the actual ads aired on TV. 
Id. 
 182 United States v. Int’l Union United Auto. Aircraft & Agr. Implement Workers of 
Am., 352 U.S 567, 597 (1957) (“Some may think that one group or another should not ex-
press its views in an election because it is too powerful, because it advocates unpopular 
ideas, or because it has a record of lawless action. But these are not justifications for with-
holding First Amendment rights from any group.”). 
 183 Tarini Parti, $7 Billion Spent On 2012 Campaign, FEC says, POLITICO (Jan. 31, 2013, 
10:26 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/01/7-billion-spent-on-2012-campaign-fec-
says-87051.html. 
 184 Estimated Cost of Election 2014, OPEN SECRETS, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/cost.php (last visited Aug. 26, 2015); see also 2014 
Election Overview, OPEN SECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/ (last visited Aug. 
26, 2015); see also Parti, supra note 183 (each election becomes more expensive than the 
next, the total spent in the 2012 election was greater than the number of people on the planet 
– totaling about $7 billion spent by candidates, parties, and outside groups.). 
 185 Press Release, Fed. Election Comm’n, FEC Summarizes Campaign Activity of the 
2011-2012 Election Cycle (Apr. 19, 2013), 
http://www.fec.gov/press/press2013/pdf/20130419release.pdf; see also FPCC & FPAF 
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Internet content, these non-profits are not obligated to disclose their donors and 
members.186 This means that the rampant corruption and evils of “dark money,” 
so often touted by “activists” like Chairwoman Ravel, accounted for roughly 
4% of all contributions made during the 2012 presidential election. 
These donations are distinct from pure speech posted online in that they do 
carry a “paid for by” disclaimer, but it does not change their comparative dim-
inution among overall political expenditures.187 A non-partisan study published 
in July 2014, found that states with aggregate or proportional contribution lim-
its were arguably more corrupt than states without such limits.188  Restricting 
cost-free political speech on the Internet and aggregate limits share a regulato-
ry motivation, which is mislabeling political speech through money as corrup-
tion.189 The existence of corruption justifiably stirs up public concern and pro-
vides regulators a reason to expand their own authority.  Expanded authority 
allows those already in power to retain power and, ultimately, it allows those 
governing to limit the speech of the governed.190 
Despite claims that individual voters are voraciously researching candidates 
and issues online in desperate reliance on unbiased facts to inform their vote,191 
                                                                                                                 
Comments at 3, Aggregate Biennial Contribution Limits. 
 186 Don Kramer, Is a Nonprofit Required to Report Anonymous Donors to the IRS?, 
NONPROFIT ISSUES, (June 14, 2011), http://www.nonprofitissues.com/to-the-point/nonprofit-
required-report-anonymous-donors-irs. 
 187 FPCC & FPAF Comments at 3, Aggregate Biennial Contribution Limits. 
 188 Matt Nese, Aggregate and Proportional Limits in the States: Have they Reduced Cor-




 189 Id. at 1. 
 190 Hearing on S.J. Res. 19 Before The S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 1 (2014) 
[hereinafter Hearing on S.J. Res. 19] (statement of Floyd Abrams, Partner, Cahill, Gordon 
& Reindel, LLP) 
The description of the constitutional amendment [S.J. Res. 19] proposes states, in its 
text, that it “relate[s] to contributions and expenditures intended to affect elections.” 
That’s one way to say it, but I think it would have been more revealing to have said 
that it actually “relate[s] to speech intended to affect elections.” And it would have 
been even more revealing, and at least as accurate, to have said that it relates to lim-
iting speech intended to affect elections. And that’s the core problem with it. It is in-
tended to limit speech about elections and it would do just that. 
Id. 
 191 McAlarney, supra note 97, at 526 (relying on a single allegation of an unexecuted 
contract which provided a bonus for a blogger in Florida, if the blogger’s negative stories 
about the candidate did not appear in the top thirty search results). 
 Before voting, many people will conduct an Internet search using the name of a 
candidate for office utilizing a search engine, such as Yahoo! Or Google.  The search 
engine produces several website links regarding the candidate. The results will pro-
duce the good, the bad, and the ugly stories. The goal of the paid political blogger is 
to crowd out the good stories listed in Internet search engine results and knock the 
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most individuals get their news and political information from sources that 
agree with a particular perspective.192 This means conservatives watch Fox 
News and listen to Mark Levin, and liberals get their news from MSNBC and 
listen to their local NPR Station.193  Just as impassioned partisan rants excite 
the homogenous demographics of these TV and radio shows, engendering fears 
of corruption is advantageous to regulators because it creates a sense of neces-
sity for increased regulations. The intrusion of overreaching regulations upon 
interactions that would otherwise be sorted between the interested parties is the 
lifeblood of the bureaucratic administrative state.194 If there is no identifiable 
need for third party government intervention—whether that need is efficiency, 
corruption, or resource allocation—there is no need for regulators.  Following 
the precedent of Buckley, the rallying cry of regulatory overreach in the area of 
campaign finance is “corruption!”195 
By the Supreme Court’s acknowledgement, the Bill of Rights exists out of 
general distrust for government.196 But the people’s distrust of government can 
be manipulated by offering governmental remedies to nonexistent problems. 
Fear that a majority or opposing political view is advanced by corruption pro-
vides a demand for regulators to protect the voice of the minority. The most 
effective method of depriving the constitutional authority of people is to in-
crease the people’s reliance on government. This unconstitutional shift of pow-
er is achieved by incrementally enacting laws and regulations that expand the 
authority of the governing class. 
                                                                                                                 
good stories off the first page of results and replace them with negative stories.). 
Id. 
 192 AMY MITCHELL & RACHEL WEISEL, PEW RES. CTR., POLITICAL POLARIZATION & ME-
DIA HABITS  1 (2014), http://www.journalism.org/files/2014/10/Political-Polarization-and-
Media-Habits-FINAL-REPORT-7-27-15.pdf (“[T]he study finds that those with the most 
consistent ideological views on the left and the right have information streams that are very 
distinct from each other and from those of individuals with more mixed political views.”). 
 193 Id.; see also Aaron Smith, Senior Researcher, Pew Res. Ctr., Pew Research Findings 
on Politics and advocacy in the social media era 43 (Jul. 29, 2014), (presentation slides 
available at http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2014/07/PAC-Aaron-Smith-Presentation.pdf). 
 194 Robert Higgs, Government Growth, LIBRARY OF ECON. AND LIBERTY, 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/GovernmentGrowth.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2015), 
(“Superimposed on the century-long trend to bigger government—measured by size, scope, 
and power—are several episodes of extraordinarily rapid growth associated with crises, 
especially the two world wars and the Great Depression.”). 
 195 Doug Kendall & Tom Donelly, Citizens United, President Obama, and His Liberal 
Naysayers, HUFF. POST (Jan. 2, 2013, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-
kendall/citizens-united-president_b_2064049.html. 
 196 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340 (“Premised on mistrust of governmental power, the 
First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints, and 
prohibited, too, are restrictions distinguishing among different speakers, allowing speech by 
some but not others.”). 
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B. Expanding the Role of Regulators 
  
Our constitutional democracy has evolved and expanded in such a way that 
government is no longer a neutral independent party.197 Rather, it is what the 
anti-Federalists feared: a government that grants itself authority to dictate the 
rights of the people.198 The Federal Register lists 435 federal agencies that are 
authorized to regulate the administrative state.199 Among these agencies, the 
FEC received 81,600 filed documents in 2013.200  In that same year, the Com-
mission closed 134 enforcement matters and settled 39 Alternative Dispute 
Resolutions for a total of roughly $770,000 in civil penalties.201  Over a 13 year 
period beginning in 2000, the FEC reviewed 2,623 compliance matters and 
assessed roughly $375,000 in Administrative Fines per year for late or non-
filing disclosure compliance.202 If the reach of the FEC’s authority is expanded 
to include free political Internet content, this figure would exponentially in-
crease. 
Data from the Pew Research Center shows that roughly 87% of Americans, 
or 277,405,638 people, use the Internet.203  Of this group, 74%, or roughly 205 
million individuals, use social media,204 and political activity is high among 
social media users; of this group 38% like or promote political content; 35% 
encourage others to vote; 34% post their own comments on politics; 33% re-
post others’ political content; 31% encourage others to take action; 28% post 
links to political articles; 21% belong to a political group; and 20% follow 
candidates or elected officials.205 At the very minimum level of political partic-
                                                 
 197 Dan Mitchell, America’s Ever-Expanding Regulatory Swamp, UNITED LIBERTY (Sept. 
4, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://www.unitedliberty.org/articles/18582-america-s-ever-expanding-
regulatory-swamp (analyzing statistics on the broad impact of regulations on employment, 
economics and the associated costs needed to sustain them). 
 198 The Brutus No. 1; but see ANN WARD & LEE WARD, THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COM-
PANION TO FEDERALISM (Ann Ward & Lee Ward, 2009). 
 199 Agency List, OFF. OF THE FED. REG., https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies (last 
visited Mar. 14, 2015). 
 200 FED. ELECTION COMM’N, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 
2013, at iii, 14 (2013), 
http://www.fec.gov/pages/budget/fy2013/FEC_Final_PAR_2013_121613.pdf. 
 201 Id. at 23 (assessing $730,390 in civil penalties from enforcement matters and $36,850 
from Alternative Dispute Resolution). 
 202 See id. 
 203 MAEVE DUGGAN ET AL., PEW RES. CTR., SOCIAL MEDIA UPDATE 2014, at 2 (2015), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2015/01/PI_SocialMediaUpdate20144.pdf; cf. USA 
QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Aug. 5, 2015, 8:59 AM), 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html. 
 204 Social Networking Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR., http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-
sheets/social-networking-fact-sheet/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2015). 
 205 Smith, supra note 193, at 25. 
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ipation online, this means that more than 4 million individuals would now be 
subject to the FEC’s review.206  The supposed goal of these potential regula-
tions is to prevent corruption in free Internet content, but it would monumen-
tally expand the FEC’s authority into the homes of millions of Americans. 
C. The Ultimate Winners of Political Speech Restrictions are Incumbent 
Politicians 
Limitations that restrict the quantity and content of political speech benefit 
incumbent office holders because these individuals are known to the public, 
more able to raise money, and are able to use the stature of their offices for 
self-promotion through legislative initiatives and news coverage.207 Not satis-
fied with the benefits of incumbency, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 
2002 (commonly known as McCain-Feingold)208 attempted to “level electoral 
opportunities”209 based on the personal wealth of candidates. The Court in Da-
vis struck this measure for impermissibly granting Congress the authority held 
by the voters.210  Similarly, the speech limitations struck down by McCutcheon, 
were the result of Congress’ attempt to divine the amount of money and the 
number of candidates an individual could donate to before corruption arose.211  
Prior to the Court’s decision, Congress decided that an individual could con-
tribute $2,600 to 18 candidates, but the 19th would arbitrarily trigger the ap-
pearance or actuality of corruption.212 An FEC regulation governing free Inter-
                                                 
 206 Cf. id. (“4 million” represents twenty percent of the 205 million social media users 
that follow candidates and elected officials on social media). 
 207 George F. Will, McCain-Feingold’s Wealth of Hypocrisy, WASH. POST (Nov. 22, 
2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/11/21/AR2007112101859.html. 
 208 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) 
(codified in scattered sections of 2 and 36 U.S.C.). 
 209 Davis, 554 U.S. at 741. 
 210 Id. (“The argument that a candidate’s speech may be restricted in order to “level elec-
toral opportunities” has ominous implications because it would permit Congress to arrogate 
the voters’ authority to evaluate the strengths of candidates competing for office”); see also 
Hearing on S.J. Res. 19, supra note 190 (statement of Floyd Abrams, Partner, Cahill, Gor-
don & Reindel, LLP). 
[Laws based on] the disturbing concept that those who hold office in both federal 
and state legislatures, armed with all the advantages of incumbency, may effectively 
prevent their opponents from becoming known to the public, by adopting legislation 
. . . limiting the total amounts they may raise and spend in an effort to do so. 
Id. 
 211 See George F. Will, Supreme Court Can Rescue Another Freedom In a Campaign 
Cash Case, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/george-
will-supreme-court-can-rescue-another-freeom-in-a-campaign-cash-
case/2013/10/04/77bd9e42-2d23-11e3-97a3-ff2758228523_story.html. 
 212 See id. 
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net content would not be the product of elected legislators, but it would serve 
the interests of the elected.213 Limiting speech on the Internet would limit dis-
sent, reduce investigation, and deprive our democracy of one of its greatest 
assets—free speech. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Internet is the most dynamic populist forum for political speech that we 
enjoy today. In the process of becoming the existential plane where more peo-
ple spend their time, the Internet has also become the principal forum for polit-
ical debate. The regulation of free political Internet content is not included in 
the FEC’s current regulations, and for good reason. Abandoning the FEC’s 
2006 Internet rules would restrict the peoples’ right to engage in the realm of 
political debate.214 Additionally, the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 as 
amended does not authorize the FEC to regulate the type of cost-free pure 
speech that exists on the Internet. The Act does not authorize the FEC to do so, 
because it would be facially unconstitutional and it would chill speech. 
 
                                                 
 213 See id. (“[A]ll laws regulating the competition for elective offices are written by oc-
cupants of such offices, people who have a permanent and powerful temptation to shape the 
political process to favor incumbents”). 
 214 Hearing on S.J. Res. 19, supra note 190 (statement of Floyd Abrams, Partner, Cahill, 
Gordon & Reindel, LLP). 
